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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the impact of illegal U.S. arms
transfers upon recipient nations' war fighting capabilities
and upon the American national security. Data were gathered
primarily from U.S. District Court records and interviews
with U.S. governmental officials from intelligence services
and the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State. An
investigation of the illicit arms transfers to Iran formed
the basis of conclusions reached.
Additionally, policy recommendations are provided to
enhance the governmental detection and investigation of
illegal export violations. The viability of utilizing court
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I. ILLEGAL ARMS EXPORTS FROM THE U.S.:
RATIONALE AND RESEARCH METHODS
A. INTRODUCTION
An anonymous letter was received by the FBI in March
1983, alleging that a small cadre consisting of an insurance
salesman, his wife and brother, a DoD civilian, two U.S.
Navy sailors and an Iranian businessman were stealing
government property for illegal export and sale to Iran.
In December of 1984, after months of inter-agency
jurisdictional squabbling between the FBI, U.S. Customs, and
the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Customs finally
uncovered the first substantial piece of evidence to
corroborate the accusation. Within a month, two shipments
of military hardware, valued at $186,000 and concealed in
crates marked "auto parts," were intercepted.
The details of the conspiracy soon became apparent. The
sailors, Cayabyab and Rodriguez, stole the parts from the
Navy supply system and the Agustins (Edgardo, Franklin and
Julie) exported the components to Saeid Inanlou in London,
who forwarded them to Iran.
The theft ring did not employ sophisticated methods or
take elaborate lengths to cover their activities. The
Agustins personally carried boxes of embargoed parts to the
freight shipping company, used their own address for the
mailing, used their personal bank accounts for transactions
1
involving other conspirators, and spoke openly on their
telephones about the operation. Yet their illegal exporting
operation was not stopped until years after its start, and
even this delayed action was made possible only by the
submission of anonymous letters correctly describing the
entire operation of the ring. [Refs. l:p. 1; 2:p. 1; 3:p.
17; 4:p. 4; 5:p. 1; 6:p. 1]
Government sources document 26 "known" shipments of
military materials illegally exported to Iran by the Agustin
theft ring. But Customs investigators were only able to
search eight shipments, which yielded the recovery of more
than $2.5 million worth of military equipment. [Ref. l:p.
1] An extensive probe by Navy supply officers, maintenance
facility and base commanders, NIS agents, Customs officials,
FBI agents, and State Department personnel has failed to
determine the full extent of this conspiracy's activities.
This story represents a new phenomenon in the world of
international arms trading, illegal arms transactions
directly related to U.S. national security. While
clandestine munitions exports have presumably occurred since
export laws were established in the 1930s, the magnitude of
this black market has reached unprecedented proportions in
the last decade. In this particular case, the DoD supply
system was penetrated to obtain the exhorted components. A
review of a representative sample of the most significant
illegal export cases, presented later in this study, will
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show that it is part of a larger pattern which has continued
throughout the 1980s.
In this research we will attempt to illustrate the
breadth of the illegal arms trade, the major effects it
produces in both recipient and donor nations, and the
benefits derived from usage of court documents as
intelligence tools. The recent, widely publicized Iran-Iraq
War has provided a well-documented sample of illegal arms
export cases on which to base this study.
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE PHENOMENON
Why would officials from all branches of the government
be interested in understanding and stopping the illegal
theft and/or export of military parts and equipment to Iran?
While such illegal activities may seem to be the responsi-
bility of only the Justice Department, for prosecution, the
ramifications of these actions touch all levels of
government accountability. Thefts, and the simple illegal
export of military components affects the ability of U.S.
military supply departments to correctly monitor their
equipment/parts inventory levels, of military units to
maintain their equipment in an operational status, of armed
forces commands to ensure their states of readiness, and of
the Secretary of Defense to maintain an assured national
security.
As an example, if parts for F-14 fighter aircraft are
stolen from the Navy's supply warehouses, replacement orders
3
will not take place when the inventory reaches a predeter-
mined level. Supply officers have an erroneous count of
available parts. If several F-14s have simultaneous
malfunctions of the stolen parts, there may not be enough
remaining parts available to return all inoperable aircraft
back to an operational status. The unexpected "downings" of
several F-14s will lower the readiness of their parent
squadrons, and likewise of their encompassing air wings.
Should a need for fighter escort for U.S. sorties occur, and
several needed F-14s are unavailable to provide this
service, the overall national security may be endangered.
All of these negative consequences can result from an
inaccurate accounting of military parts inventories.
This example shows some possible impacts upon the United
States from thefts of military parts, but the consequences
for the recipient of these shipments are just as signifi-
cant. Iran was a nation whose military was predominantly
composed of U.S. equipment, unable to legally import parts
fr.m U.S. manufacturers, and desperately fighting a
personnel and equipment-consuming war with her neighbor.
The receipt of American parts through any means was
essential to her war-fighting capabilities. Through normal
attrition and combat losses, Iran's pre-war air force
strength of about 400 planes--mostly F-4s, F-5s and F-14s--
had plummeted by 1985 to approximately 70 to 90 usable
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combat aircraft. Her best air defense system--the U.S.-
built Hawk missile system--was by then out of commission due
to lack of replacement parts. And Iran desperately wanted
to buy 600 Sidewinder, 600 Sparrow and 30 Phoenix missiles
for airborne use in air defense. [Ref. 7:p. 10] Most of
these equipment failures were due to shortages of U.S.
replacement parts. And the receipt of any U.S. parts woula
help to restore equipment into an operational status,
allowing its return to combat action. Before the end of the
war, several arms dealers argued that the United States had
effectively managed to stop all new arms sales to Iran,
through its embargo and "Operation Staunch." Operation
Staunch is the on-going, American-sponsored world-wide
effort to halt arms sales to Iran. The end result of this
accomplishment was the preventing of the Iranian militar
from possessing the quantity or quality of weapons necessary
to continue fighting the Iraqis. [Ref. 8:p. 7] But
despite this embargo the Iranians were able to continue
fighting the Iraqis until July 20, 1988, due in part to
receipt of illegally exported U.S. parts.
Another possible result of Iran's receipt of illegally
exported U.S. military parts was her enhanced prestige in
the Middle Eastern world. This was achieved through her
continued ability to project military power in spite of the
coordinated efforts against her by a superpower. By
receiving parts covertly shipped from the United States,
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Iran frustrated the desires and efforts of the American
government, and continued to be capable -f wagin- war
against Iraq until mid-1988.
By making even a casual investigation of the effects of
illegal arms exports From the United States, an interested
party discovers that the actions of a small network of
larcenous individuals can influence the collective Fecurity
of a nation, and can enable a warring nation to keep at
least some of its sophisticated equipment operational in
spite of officially sanctioned embargoes. Therefore the
subject of illegal arms/parts exports is important for
study.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL OBSTACLES
In the course of conducting this study some important
questions served as the focus for research. A review of
arms transfer publicati-ns revealed legal arms purchases and
deliveries. Information concerning weapons sales are
delivered by munit. ns corporations or by governments
themselves to interested agencies--such as the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)--which
annually compile statistics into organized listings by
nation.
The illegal arms sales are covert and therefore much
more difficilt to track. While U.S. Customs agents
routinely inspect crates awaiting shipment at docks, their
actions only contribute to about five percent of discovered
6
illegal export attempts. According to government officials,
approximately 86 percent of discovered illegal export
efforts are identified through the compliance of paid
informants and cooperating (unpaid) industrial sources. All
other discoveries are prompted by anonymous tips, referrals
from other investigating government agencies, or export
documentation reviews.1
Because these illegal sales and transfers of arms are
clandestine, no one is sure of the extent of the practice.
It is unrealistic to believe that every illegal arms export
attempt was exposed. Researchers are limited in discussing
the magnitude of undiscovered illegal exports, because "one
does not know what one does not know." Michael Klare, an
authority on the subject of arms transfers, believes that
the discovered attempts at illegal arms export were just
"the tip of the iceberg," and that such arms deals occur
every day, most being undetected. [Ref. 9:pp. 16-243
Michael Brzoska, a political scientist also specializing in
arms transfers, notes that Iran made extensive use of
illegal arms deals during her war with Iraq. [Ref. l0:pp.
42-45]2
1. Interview with U.S. Government officials, 02
February 1989.
2. For additional background on illegal U.S. arms
exporting, see Edward J. Laurance's article: "The New
Gunrunning," Orbis, Spring 1989, pp. 1-13. Stephanie G.
Neuman provides a different perspective on the control of
arms exports in her article: "Arms, Aid and the
Superpowers," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1988, pp. 1044-1066.
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In focusing our research of illegal arms exports on
Iran, five questions directed the study.
1. What was the Frequency or Extent of IlleQal U.S.
Arms Traffic to Iran?
The very nature of this phenomenon makes this
research question extremely challenging. Representatives of
the U.S. Customs Department, the State Department, and the
Justice Department all agreed that it was very difficult to
accurately determine the extent of illegal exporting
conducted to Iran from the United States. Officials were
unsure whether to assume that no illegal exports occurred,
which wouldn't provide any illegal shipments to detect, or
to believe that some amount of illegal activity took place
and officials simply failed to detect it. 3 Government
officials could attempt extrapolation of Iranian weapons
systems' service lives with the known deliveries of
replacement parts, and could then compare these expectations
with the observed operational weapons systems. By utilizing
this scheme, all weapons systems operational beyond their
expected service lives could be assumed to have received
undiscovered exports of replacement parts. This is a highly
inaccurate and ineffective method of research.
3. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January 1989, 01 February 1989, 01-02 February 1989.
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2. What were the Effects upon Iran's War Fighting
Capability Caused by the Receipt of Illegally
Exported Equipment?
To correctly determine the effect of illegally
exported parts upon Iran's war performance, it was necessary
to distinguish between parts that were received and quickly
shipped to those units requiring them, and parts that were
received but which languished in warehouses. It was rumored
that some equipment, such as TOW missiles, was sent to units
with the greatest visibility, and not to those which could
have utilized the weapons for their intended functions. 4
A vital question concerning the effect of illegally
received U.S. parts on Iran's war fighting capabilities
involved Iranian abilities to correctly install sophisti-
cated parts after receiving them. If there existed a fully-
trained organization of maintenance technicians skilled in
the servicing of the most complicated U.S. weapons system
possessed by Iran, then it may be assumed that almost every
part received in Iran resulted in the upgrading of a weapon.
However, if there existed only a few fully-trained Iranian
technicians skilled in maintaining sophisticated weapons
systems, due to a previous dependence upon Western
maintenance technicians or because of wide-spread executions
of Western-trained personnel following the first days of the
Iranian Revolution, then possibly many U.S. parts were
4. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January and 03 February 1989.
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received but were unable to be correctly installed in their
intended systems.
5
The question arose as to whether or not Iran
utilized any foreign maintenance expertise in training their
technicians or in directly repairing sophisticated weapons.
While government officials concur that there were no
Americans living in Iran after the release of the embassy
hostages, specific details concerning Israeli and other
foreign maintenance experts are unavailable.6
Information was not available concerning the Iranian
maintenance personnel's percentage of successful repairs on
highly technical systems as compared to low technical
systems. To have known these figures would have allowed a
statement concerning the degree of usage derived from
receiving "low tech" parts compared to "high tech" ones.
Knowing that the first months of the Iranian Revolution saw
mass executions of Western trained and/or sympathetic
individuals, and knowing that much of the military's
maintenance force was included in this number, would suggest
that Iran's "high tech" repair capabilities fell
dramatically during this time period.7
5. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January and 03 February 1989.
6. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January 1989, 03 February 1989.
7. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January and 03 February 1989.
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Most of these questions are of the sort that escape
quantification by a nation that was more concerned with
acquiring evasive and costly military parts than with
maintaining accurate administrative inventories. Those
circumstances made the job of an observer nation trying to
ascertain current Iranian parts inventories doubly
difficult.
The question of effects upon Iran's war fighting
capability derived from illegally exported arms is directly
related to at least three concepts: (1) the definition of
military capability, (2) the means by which a nation
acquires its weapons capabilities, and (3) the level of
technology transferred. These concepts are the ideas around
which this thesis was organized.
a. Definition of Military Capability
The study of effects derived from illegally
exported arms is dependent upon the definition of "military
capability." In order to determine if these arms and parts
had any significant influence on Iran's war fighting
capability--or her "military capability"--then an under-
standing of this term is required. The Department of
Defense (DOD) defines "military capability" as the ability
to achieve a specified wartime objective--for example, to
win a battle or a war or to destroy a target. Because
military capability is a broad term which cannot be readily
11
quantified, the DOD has divided capability into the
following four subsets or pillars: [Ref. ll:p. 7]
- Readiness--the ability of the military forces, units,
weapons systems, or equipment to deliver the output for
which they were designed in peacetime and at the
outbreak of hostilities. Readiness is measured in terms
of manning, equipping, and training the force, and is
defined to include the force's ability to mobilize,
deploy, and employ their weapons systems without
unacceptable delays.
- Sustainability--the staying power of military forces, or
how long the forces can continue to fight. Sustainabil-
ity involves the ability to resupply engaged forces
during combat operations and is sometimes measured in
terms of the estimated number of fighting days for which
supplies are available.
- Modernization--the technical sophistication of forces,
units, weapons systems, and equipment. Modernization
can include new procurement and/or modifications,
depending upon the service. Assessments of moderniza-
tion may compare new types of equipment with the items
that they replaced or may compare equipment in the U.S.
inventory with that of potential adversary forces.
- Force Structure--the numbers, size, and composition of
units constituting the military forces. Force structure
is usually described as numbers of divisions, ships, or
air wings.
In the discussion of Iranian military capability
as related to the receipt of illegally exported U.S. parts,
the principle focus will be on force structure, readiness
and sustainability of forces. The capability of modernizing
Iran's military weapons systems through illegally shipped
parts was not feasible.
b. Means of Acquiring Military Capabilities
There are only three distinct ways in which a
nation can acquire the weapons systems that make up its
force structure. The most desirable means of obtaining
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weapons is through domestic manufacture. This method will
ensure availability of the arms unless the raw materials
become unavailable or enemy attacks destroy the
factories/supply lines. The second most favorable way of
obtaining weapons is through purchasing them from foreign
manufacturers. When relations between countries are
friendly, this method is satisfactory for the acquisition of
arms, but is not as economically favorable to the recipient
nation. However, when relationships between countries
become strained, as often occurs in times of war, the sale
and delivery of arms is no longer certain. As a last resort
in the acquisition of weapons, employed when the previous
two options are not possible, a country can choose to
illegally procure foreign weapons. This may be done by
directly stealing the arms and smuggling them back to the
home nation, or by recruiting other "agents" to obtain and
illegally export the arms to the home nation.
The status of the Iranian military capability
during the period of 1980-1988 will be discussed in order to
determine the effects caused by illegally exported arms and
parts. There are only three general scenarios that could
describe a nation's military capability over an eight year
period. First, a nation may grow in military strength over
the observed period, ending in a more capable state than
originally seen. Secondly, a nation may decline in military
13
strength over the observed period. Lastly, the nation may
remain at the same level of strength.
Because Iran became ever more forced to
illegally acquire its military spare parts as the war
continued from 1980 until 1988, the assessment of its
military capability over this period would indicate the
effectiveness of its illegal acquisition program.
c. Level of Technology Transferred
A review of the level of Iranian technology is
necessary to determine the usefulness of "high tech" versus
"low tech" illegally exported parts received in Iran. If
the Iranian technology level was high, then most "high tech"
received parts could have been effectively utilized by
technicians to repair equipment, and possibly could have
been imitated and remanufactured in Iran. But if Iranian
technology was operating at a low level of effectiveness,
then only the "low tech" received parts could have been
properly utilized and possibly remanufactured domestically.
It was the common belief among officials from the U.S. State
Department and Defense Investigative Agency that Iran did
not possess an advanced level of technological expertise,
and that her manufacturing of military items was restricted
to the most simple products--such as small arms, artillery
pieces, and ammunition.8
8. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 31
January and 03 February 1989.
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3. Did a Relationship Exist Between Illegal Exports to
Iran and Future Iranian War Plans?
It is reasonable to expect a nation without the
means to produce or buy sophisticated air defense and
offensive missile systems to attempt illegal acquisition of
these items substantially prior to planned offenses
requiring these capabilities. If this assumption is true,
then observers can discover the future war plans of nations
having to illegally acquire their weapons through study of
their parts requested. The same would hold true for other
types of war plans.
4. To What Extent, if Any, Did Illeaal Exports of U.S.
Arms or Parts DamaQe U.S. National Security?
Illegally exported U.S. military equipment can have
negative consequences for the national security of the
United States. As mentioned earlier in this study, thefts
of military parts and weapons cause undiscovered shortages
in the military supply systems. This can become a serious
liability when emergencies arise which require the issue of
these parts, only to discover their absence. This shortage
of parts can quickly impact upon readiness, as equipment
failures experienced under combat conditions are unable to
be repaired because of the lack of parts thought to exist in
the supply system. Even the secret "Irangate" arms
transactions left the U.S. parts supply in a particularly
vulnerable position. According to news accounts, these
"sanctioned" but secret deals adversely affected the U.S.
15
inventories of 46 out of the 234 parts making up the AN/MPQ-
46 Hawk missile system radar. Of the sales of these 46
parts, 15 totally depleted the U.S. inventory, 11 reduced it
by one-half, and the remaining 20 had a lesser but still
significant effect. [Ref. 12:p. 1]
Not only did the illegally exported parts adversely
affect the U.S. military supply inventories, but they were
used to repair the weapons systems of a determined enemy
capable of utilizing these systems against American forces
deployed in the Persian Gulf. American lives and military
equipment were facing increased danger in the Persian Gulf
due to the Iranian arms repairs made by utilizing illegally
exported U.S. parts. 9
5. Could Court Records or U.S. Customs Indictments be
Useful as Tools for Intelligence Gathering?
The final research question concerns the intelli-
gence data available from researching court records and U.S.
Customs indictments. While the nation's intelligence
gathering organizations utilize all sorts of "open"
unclassified documents such as shipping schedules and bills
of lading to determine cargoes being shipped to other
nations, there are broad areas of missing knowledge by using
9. For a further discussion on the effects of illegal
arms exports see Edward J. Laurance's article: "The New
Gunrunning," Orbis, Spring 1989, pp. 8-12. Dr. Laurance
lists the following as consequences of illegal exports:
arming adversaries, complicating military planning and
threat analysis, frustrating conflict control, penetrating
the military supply system, reducing the readiness of U.S.
forces, and harming foreign relations.
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only these sources. Human contacts in other ships and
reconnaissance aircraft along ships' routes can take
photographs of deck loadings, and compare these with the
deck configurations upon sailing, to determine what
equipment has been off-loaded. And by noting the
displacement of the ship before and after leaving port,
observers can get an accurate estimate of the weight of
cargo off-loaded or on-loaded. But these methods, as
effective as they are, do not provide all of the information
that intelligence analysts would desire. Officials from
both the Navy Operational Intelligence Center and the
Defense Investigative Agency agreed that the study of court
records and U.S. Customs indictments could provide
information concerning trends of parts smuggling. Such
trends might include common sailing routes of ships
smuggling equipment, and the use of certain ports as middle
destinations from which parts could be diverted to a
prohibited country.1 0 Another previously unutilized source
of intelligence found in court records are the transcripts
from verbatim wire taps. Relationships and data discovered
in these recorded conversations can provide substantial
background information not previously known. By identifying
these trends in the illegal exporting of arms and parts,
U.S. Customs agents and other interested governmental
10. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January 1989, 03 February 1989.
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agencies could more effectively discover and stop this
practice that is so damaging to national security.
D. HYPOTHESES
The five general research questions generated six
hypotheses. They are tested in regard to illegal arms
exports bound for Iran, but may have a more universal
application. First to be considered is the proposition that
illegal arms exports are mainly motivated through monetary
greed. While a broad range of human characteristics could
potentially inspire these illegal actions, it appears that a
desire for monetary gain was the nearly unanimous cause of
those discovered export violators.
Secondly, it is hypothesized that the recipient benefits
from illegal exports are minimal due to the low volume and
infrequent shipments of arms. The value of the parts and
arms may be considerable, but because of the high consump-
tion rate of parts experienced in wartime, overall receipts
would be too small in number to matter significantly.
Thirdly, a nation's future war plans are indicated by
their illegal arms/parts requests. Stated differently, an
interested nation can determine another nation's future war
plans through study of their efforts to illegally acquire
arms and parts. This appears to be true in spite of the
very limited success rates that are generally achieved in
illegal arms export attempts.
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Fourthly, as the exported technology level becomes
lower, the chances for its successful use become greater.
Again, stated differently, the lower the exported technology
level, the higher is the chance for its effective use.
Technologically simple parts and equipment withstand the
rigors of shipment better than do more sophisticated gear,
and simple arms require less technical training for the
users than do more complicated ones. Both types of
technology were illegally shipped to Iran during the period
in question.
Fifthly, as the received equipment becomes more
technical, a greater dependence upon foreign maintenance is
required. Similar to the previous hypothesis, simple arms
require less technical training for the maintainers than do
complicated ones. While it is relatively commonplace for
any nation to have technicians with expertise in repairing
personal rifles and sidearms, it is not to be expected that
a nation possesses skilled maintainers of Phoenix missiles
or Hawk air defense systems.
Lastly, the national security impact derived from
illegally exported arms and parts varies with the ease of
countermeasures development. For example, in the Persian
Gulf American aviation forces faced the potential challenge
of evading Hawk air defense system missiles, if they
conducted air strikes against mainland Iran. However, the
United States had not earlier considered the need for
19
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countermeasures to this U.S. system, and it was not until
the final portion of the war that any countermeasures to
this system were formulated.1 1 Until that time, there
existed a threat to the American national security because
Navy strike aircraft had no effective plans for evading the
Hawk threat. Contrarily, the existence of TOW missiles in
Iran did not pose a national security concern because there
were no American-manned tanks in Iran--the target of TOW
missiles.12
E. DATA
One of the major objectives of this research is the
development of new sources of data on this recent and under-
researched phenomenon. The data for this thesis were
gathered from a variety of sources. So much has been
published in journals, news magazines, and daily newspapers
concerning illegal arms exports to Iran that it was
difficult to sort through all material that was available.
Several recent books dealing with Iran and Iraq proved
helpful in understanding Iran's in-place weapons systems and
her need for spare parts. But certainly the daily news
articles found in national newspapers were the most timely
11. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January 1989, 03 February 1989.
12. Interview with U.S. Government official, 03
February 1989.
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and usually accurate sources of information on all aspects
of U.S.-Iranian relations.
An invaluable source of information not readily
available to most researchers on this subject was the
personal views of industrial arms manufacturers and
governmental experts in the areas of the Middle East and
Iran. Officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Navy
Operational Intelligence Center, U.S. Customs Service, U.S.
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of State, and the
Varian Corporation, revealed many insights not discussed in
other sources. These individuals were the "key players"
that maintained a watchful eye against any illegal arms
exports during the period of the embargo against Iran, and
the ones that kept track of U.S. successes and failures in
this arena. While most of their comments were unclassified
and suitable for printing in a daily newscast, many of their
comments revealed points of view not previously expressed in
print or on televised newscasts.
Important data were obtained through the review of court
records. Thorough histories of the background events
leading to illegal arms export attempts were documented.
Again, the normal volume of materials available for perusal
on any case proved to be a hindrance, because great amounts
of time were required in sorting through legal terminology
to arrive at pertinent aspects of the records. However,
once the appropriate portions of the court records were
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discovered, a wealth of detail concerning the history of the
alleged offense was provided.
Lastly, much data were obtained through the reading of
U.S. Customs indictments and other case documents. Although
the indictments generally outlined only the legal charges
against defendants, some of the supporting Customs documents
provided great detail into specific circumstances of the
case.
While there were many sources which provided data for
this study, there were a number of hindrances and
inconveniences that made information-gathering frustrating.
A seeming benefit that was to prove disconcerting was the
volume of newspaper articles dealing with at least some
aspect of this topic. Every day's newspaper, each week's
news magazines, and each month's journals would offer
usually several articles on Iran and/or illegal arms
exports.
While much was written concerning illegal arms exports
to Iran, there was not a lot of detail concerning this
subject, since only the discovered exports could be reported
upon. No one was ever sure as to the extent of the problem,
nor of what equipment actually was received in Iran. And
the effects of the received illegal exports were not
generally reported, because details of Iran's military
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capability were classified, and disputed among the various
governmental branches.13
There was a great difficulty in obtaining copies of U.S.
Customs documents, and even in obtaining permission to speak
with applicable officials involved with aspects of this
study. Most U.S. Customs receptionists were not used to
offering any assistance in the research of cases. The
unavailability of official documents was sometimes
understandable due to the ongoing nature of cases and their
appeals, which required both privacy for the individuals
involved and protection of the arguments and evidence to be
presented later by U.S. Customs officials. Some of the
records were unavailable due to their relationship to other
ongoing cases. And lastly, some documents were classified
due to their revelations of U.S. Customs' investigative
methods and contacts. However difficult it may have been to
penetrate these bureaucratic and administrative hurdles, the
sincere interest and selfless efforts of the interviewed
Customs officials were refreshing and an invaluable source
of previously undiscovered information.
It was also difficult to obtain trial transcipts for
applicable export cases. The court cases are transcribed in
a six-key "shorthand" that was not always available upon
request. Court stenographers transcribe their "shorthand"
13. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30-31
January, 1989, 01 February 1989, and 03 February 1989.
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into the readable court records as time permits, and they
face a seemingly inexhaustible arrival of court cases
demanding their attention. In addition to the occasions
when court records were not available due to stenographer
backlogging, records were sometimes unavailable due to use
by the court. Because the availability of records could not
be determined by telephone before traveling to the court,
and because the retrieval of records could not be performed
by court clerks for the interested parties, wasted days of
travel occurred in the attempt to research records being
updated by judges. But even more frustrating than the
occasional absence of a court record is the great geographi-
cal distances separating the nation's court cases. Cases
are maintained at the court where they were tried, and at no
other court. Therefore, court cases dealing with illegal
arms exports were housed in San Diego, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco, California; Houston and Dallas, Texas; Baltimore,
Maryland; and Boston, Massachusetts, among several other
widely dispersed locations. Busy work schedules prevent any
of the court secretaries from duplicating needed documents
for the researcher. This inconvenience requires either
personal visits to each of the courts possessing needed
court records, or having colleagues/friends located nearby
the courts visit the court libraries, spend the time to
locate the required documents, and duplicate the needed
information. This difficulty caused the greatest amount of
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frustration in the thesis data collection. Much additional
information for this study would have been available from
court records, if only the nearby courts could have held
copies of needed information contained only in courts
located across the nation.
F. SELECTION OF IRAN AS A POLICY RELEVANT SAMPLE
The selection of Iran as the nation to be studied for
effects resulting from illegal arms exports was dependent
upon five factors. There were certainly more powerful
nations than Iran that continually attempted to illegally
export all types of American arms technology to their
shores. But several factors exclusive to Iran resulted in
its use as the universe of this study. First, at the
beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was heavily dependent
upon U.S. weapons systems. This need for U.S. spare parts,
when combined with the American embargo, created a situation
conducive for the illegal export of military equipment.
Although some of her needed parts were available from
sources outside of the United States, for example F-4 and F-
5 components, as the American effort to prevent other
nations from supplying Iran with defense materials gained
momentum, Iran was forced to acquire her needed parts from
U.S. sources.
Secondly, Iran was the sole-source recipient for one key
American weapon system--the F-14 Tomcat. This meant that no
other country had F-14 aircraft or its spare parts. Because
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of this extremely rare circumstance, the only source that
Iran had for acquiring additional F-14 spare parts--besides
cannibalization--was through the U.S. Naval supply system or
the Gruman Corporation.
Thirdly, Iran was chosen for study because of the
history of U.S. military involvement within her borders.
Until the Shah evacuated Iran in January 1979, United States
advisers were stationed in that country and they set up a
detailed supply system inventory and ordering system that
allowed the Iranians to acquire any parts needed for their
U.S. weapons systems. This relationship with the American
military made the future illegal Iranian ordering of U.S.
parts far easier than if they had not been instructed in the
military supply system.
Fourth, primarily because of the presence of U.S. Naval
forces in the Persian Gulf, the illegal export of U.S. arms
to Iran posed an American national security risk. The very
arms and spare parts being illegally received by Iran could
have potentially been utilized against American military
forces in the Persian Gulf.
Lastly, the Iranian example of illegal exporting of U.S.
arms was a recent case that enjoyed thorough documentation
and constant publicity. There was no difficulty in
obtaining sufficient data for this study from the public
press, from court indictments and cases, and from interviews
with officials from diverse branches of the government.
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Because of the widespread documentation of Iranian illegal
arms exports, because of the critical Iranian need for U.S.
weapons spare parts, and because of the danger this practice
caused to the security of the United States, Iran was
selected as the nation to study concerning illegal arms
export effects.
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II. CHRONOLOGY OF IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IRANIAN ARMS
ACOUISITION PATTERNS, ILLEGAL ARMS SALES
AND LEGAL ARMS ACQUISITION
A. CHRONOLOGY OF WAR
In order to properly understand the effects of illegal
U.S. arms exports upon Iran's military capabilities during
her war with Iraq, it is necessary to possess a good
background knowledge of the history of the Iran-Iraq War, an
understanding of how countries can obtain weapons and parts,
an understanding of the American embargo against Iran and
the definition of an illegal export. Additionally, the
reader should know the general pattern of illegal arms
sales, the nature of Iranian arms imports, and the Iranian
usage of illegally exported U.S. parts in the prosecution of
their war. Only with these supporting facts can the reader
make accurate assessments of the true effects caused by
illegal arms exports.
The Iran-Iraq War began in September 1980 and lasted
longer than either World War or the Korean War. The world
has not witnessed battles of such intensity or losses of
such magnitude since the Korean War. This conflict resulted
in more deaths and destruction than all of the Arab-Israeli
wars combined. The strategic importance of Iran and Iraq,
because of their location and oil reserves, made the
conflict disconcerting to the Middle East and Persian Gulf
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countries, the superpowers, and the rest of the world. The
war brought about new political and military alignments in
the region and created doubts about future relations between
Arab nations, their neighbors, the superpowers and other
countries. [Ref. 13:pp. 299-300]
There were a multitude of factors that contributed to
the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq on 22
September 1980. With the success of the Iranian Revolution,
Iraq was faced with a revisionist power determined to
reshape the region in its own image. From June 1979 onwards
the Iranian regime showed its deep hostility towards the
Iraqi Ba'ath reign through anti-Ba'ath demonstrations
including armed attacks on Iraqis and Iraqi-owned
installations in Iran. These attacks were paralleled by a
fierce media propaganda plan that urged the Iraqi people to
rise up and overthrow the Ba'ath regime. Iran also resumed
its support for the Iraqi Kurds in late 1979, provided
material and moral support to underground Shi'ite movements
in Iraq, and initiated terrorist attacks against prominent
Iraqi officials. [Refs. 13:pp. 300-301; 14:pp. 11-12]
Iraq attempted to check these Iranian pressures by
suppressing the Shi'ite underground organizations, expelling
Iranian citizens, attempting to organize a united Arab front
to oppose the export of the Iranian revolution, supporting
Iranian separatist elements, and finally through
accelerating its arms purchases. Unfortunately, none of
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these Iraqi initiatives changed the motives of the Iranians.
Ayatollah Khomeini on 8 April 1980 called on the Iraqi
Shi'ites to overthrow the government of Iraq's President
Saddam Hussein. Iran's president, Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr,
warned Iraq that Iran would go to war if the military
clashes along the two countries' borders escalated. Military
skirmishes began along the two nations' frontier areas in
April 1980 and continued intermittently until late August,
when they escalated into heavy fighting involving artillery,
tank duels and air strikes. [Ref. 14:p. 12]
It was Iran's subversive activities and the protracted
and escalating border fighting that drove the Iraqi
leadership to conclude that it had no choice but to contain
the Iranian threat by resorting to arms. With a temporary
tilting of the military balance of forces in its favor, Iraq
wanted to take advantage of its momentary strategic
superiority and face Iran with hard facts.
On 7 September 1980 Iraq accused Iran of shelling Iraqi
border towns from territories that also belonged to Iraq,
and demanded the immediate evacuation of Iranian forces from
these areas. Shortly afterwards Iraq moved to "liberate"
these disputed areas, resulting in a 20 September 1980
mobilization of Iranian reservists to meet this challenge.
Iraq launched its invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980.
[Refs. 13:pp. 300-301; 14:pp. 12-13]
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After approximately one month of fighting, the Iranian
city of Khurramshahr fell to the Iraqis. Having already
sought a cease-fire and having been rejected, Iraq announced
that it would hold the occupied territories but not advance
further into Iran. Twice more in 1981 a cease-fire was
requested by the Iraqis, both times resulting in rejection
by the Iranians. In 1982 the Iranians continued the
counteroffensives begun in May 1981, and the Iraqi forces
were driven back to the border. The Iranians recaptured the
city of Khurramshahr. The Iraqis announced a cease-fire and
had offered to withdraw their forces from Iran if this
action would have ended the war. The Iranians rejected this
plea. Both 1983 and 1984 saw continued Iranian attempts to
push into Iraqi territory, the most successful of which only
advanced nine miles into Iraq and captured the garrison of
Hajj Omran. The relative positions of both combatants
remained the same in 1985 and 1986, with both Iran and Iraq
mounting failed offensives, and each temporarily gaining and
then losing the other's territory. [Refs. 13:pp. 300-302;
14:pp. 19-32; 15:pp. 304-306]
While Iraq repeatedly requested a cease-fire, Iran was
consistent in its conditions for an end to the war, and
these conditions were not acceptable to the Iraqi leader-
ship. Iran's demands were: (1) that Iraq withdraw its
troops from all Iranian soil, (2) that Iraq pay reparations
for the damage done to Iran resulting from the invasion, and
31
(3) that Saddam Hussein either resign or be removed from
office in Iraq. The Iraqis would not negotiate the removal
of President Hussein, but even as Iran became increasingly
war-weary in 1987, it was clear that they would not
negotiate with the man who invaded Iran and caused so many
Iranian deaths. (Ref. 15:p. 306]
Events began to rapidly change in the early months of
1988 as Iran started feeling the effects of declining oil
revenues, war weariness and the successful American attempt
at influencing world governments to embargo arms to Iran.
By February 1988, the total amount of weaponry supplied to
Iran by foreign sources had dropped dramatically. Concur-
rently, the Iraqis began a series of cross-border assaults
and raids in February that recaptured the island of Fao and
sometimes reached as far as 25 miles inside Iran. The
Iraqis possessed a sizeable arsenal of modern aircraft,
artillery and tanks, and had the ability to escalate the war
without Iran having an appropriate way of responding. It
appears that this arms imbalance was a primary factor in the
20 July 1988 Iranian decision to accept a United Nations-
inspired cease-fire taking effect on 20 August 1988. [Ref.
8:p. 7]
B. IRANIAN ARMS ACQUISITION PATTERNS
The Iran-Iraq War began with Iran possessing mainly U.S.
designed weapons. The earlier years of leadership by Reza
Shah Pahlavi had seen a close alliance between the United
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States and Iran, resulting in the Iranian purchase of
between $3.4 and $10 billion worth of American arms to be
delivered in the years 1975-1980. The Shah actually
received 79 F-14 aircraft and ordered 160 F-16 fighter
aircraft: six batteries of improved HAWK surface-to-air
missiles; approximately 100 helicopters of various kinds;
about 350 Sidewinder, 350 Sparrow, and 425 Phoenix air-to-
air missiles; and unknown quantities of TOW and Dragon anti-
tank missiles. [Refs. 14:p. 10; 15:pp. 208-209] While the
United States and Iran were close allies, the U.S. parts
system was open for Iranian use, and all of the stock
numbers and descriptions of weapons systems parts were
available to Iranian technicians. However, when the U.S.
Embassy personnel were taken hostage by Iranian students on
November 4, 1979, steps were initiated that led to a United
States embargo of all defense related equipment bound to
Iran. [Refs. 5:p. 1; 15:p. 295] 1 Therefore, since 28
November 1979, no exports to Iran of U.S. manufactured
defense materials were authorized.
But because of the comparatively short lifetimes of
parts for sophisticated weaponry, and due to the combat
losses experienced in the first years of the war, Iran soon
found herself needing additional replacement parts for her
U.S. weapons systems. There are basically three ways that a
1. Interview with U.S. Government official, 30 January
1989.
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nation can acquire weapons, parts, or other equipment. If
their manufacturirng capability is advanced, then a nation
can often manufacture its needed equipment. This method
provides employment for its people, keeps costs for the
system at their lowest, and allows the best assurance of
delivery of the items during wartime or periods of
international stress. A second way to obtain equipment is
through its purchase from other manufacturing nations. This
method is less economically beneficial than the first, but
it allows acquisition of needed materials as long as there
exist willing sellers. As Stephanie Neuman, an expert on
arms trade and other security issues, has repeatedly stated,
in times of war or political disfavor, the buying nation may
be refused contracts by the selling nation, and so delivery
is not at all assured. [Ref. 16:pp. 1044-1066] A method
of acquiring equipment that is similar to buying it from
another country is the borrowing of equipment from allies.
This method is similar to aid packages that are sometimes
given by wealthier nations to needy countries, in that
needed parts are supplied for a specified time period often
in exchange for specified services or favors. A final
method for obtaining needed equipment is through its theft
from other countries. While Iran did utilize this method
for the attempted acquisition of F-14 parts, she more often
recruited agents to misrepresent the final destination of
military supplies that were really bound for Iranian ports.
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By hiring a U.S. citizen to purchase F-4 aircraft parts and
state that they were bound for Britain, when they actually
were traveling to Britain and then onward to Iran, Iranian
arms buyers were able to illegally acquire their needed U.S.
military parts. Iran was almost totally reduced to
resorting to this last method of obtaining U.S. parts, since
few nations would agree to sell her U.S. parts, since some
parts were solely controlled by U.S. companies--as in the
F-14 components--and since Iran possessed, at best, a
rudimentary manufacturing capability.2
The one event that prohibited Iran from being allowed to
legally purchase U.S. parts and military equipment was the
American embargo of defense items bound for Iran. The
United States suspended all licenses and approvals for
export to Iran of defense articles on 28 November 1979--24
days after Iranian students took hostage the personnel of
the American embassy in Teehran. 3
C. ILLEGAL ARMS SALES
There are several export activities that would be
defined as illegal processes. All of the following were
attempted by Iranian arms purchasers or their agents. All
exports of defense materials from the United States required
2. Interview with U.S. Government officials, 03
February 1989.
3. Interview with U.S. Government official, 31 January
1989.
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a license that was issued by the Department of Commerce.
The Department of Defense reviewed some of these licenses
for dual-use products. But no licenses were issued for
military equipment destined for Iran after 28 November 1979.
Any attempted exports of these items without a license was
an illegal export. Anyone even conspiring to ship arms
without applying for and acquiring a license was guilty of
breaking the law, without the actual shipment of any arms.
Exporters sometimes misrepresented the contents of their
shipments so as to disguise military equipment as common
civilian-use parts. This misrepresentation constituted an
illegal export. Some Iranian agents would misrepresent the
"end-user" declaration, which stated in which nation the
shipment was going to be received. By listing a nation that
was not prohibited from receiving military parts as the end-
user, a valid license could sometimes be obtained. After
the shipment of arms arrived in the declared country, the
shipper would off load the equipment onto a vessel bound for
Iran, and thereby defeat the American export laws. Such
actions were illegal exports. [Ref. 17:p. 1]
In earlier sections of this paper various ways of
violating the U.S. Arms Export Control Act were discussed.
Iran utilized all of these plans in her attempts to acquire
American spare parts. But the Iranian responsibility in
these crimes did not begin with the falsifying of an export
shipment's contents or final destination, or with a theft of
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F-14 parts from the U.S. Navy's supply system. Officials in
Iran originated "shopping lists" of the war materials that
they needed and were willing to purchase from any supplier.
These officials placed several "procurers" principally in a
heavily guarded London office building near Parliament and
Westminster Abbey to distribute their war materials
"shopping lists" and to coordinate purchases from any
interested arms or parts merchants. These procurers would
either simply receive telephone calls from interested
merchants and deals would be made, or the procurers would
themselves contact known arms merchants/manufacturers. It
was the problem of these merchants/manufacturers, or their
agents, to devise the means for getting the illegal exports
secretly past U.S. Customs agents. It was in this manner
that most of the illegal U.S. arms exports were conducted.
[Ref. 18:p. 1]4
D. LEGAL ARMS ACQUISITIONS
When considering which arms Iran caused to be illegally
exported into her country, it is helpful to know exactly
what she legally acquired during the same time frame. The
following list of arms received by Iran includes only those
items delivered after the start of the Iran-Iraq War in
4. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 21
January 1989, 01 February 1989.
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September 1979, and is compiled from the applicable volumes
of SIPRI YEARBOOKs:
YEAR OF NUMBERSUPPLIER EQUIPMENT DELIVERY DELIVERED
France Patrol Boats 1981 3
Libya Main Battle Tanks 1981 190 (Est.)
Netherlands Transport Ship 1981 2
China Fighter Aircraft 1982 50 (Est.)
China Main Battle Tanks 1982 100 (Est.)
China Tank Guns 1982 100 (Est.)
North Korea Main Battle Tanks 1982 75 (Est.)
Syria Main Battle Tanks 1982 220 (Est.)
United Kingdom Support Ship 1982 1
Argentina Main Tanks 1983 25 (Est.)
China Fighter Aircraft 1983 50 (Est.)
China Main Battle Tanks 1983 100 (Est.)
China Tank Guns 1983 100 (Est.)
North Korea Main Battle Tanks 1983 75 (Est.)
South Africa Field Guns 1983 12 (Est.)
Switzerland Trainer Aircraft 1983 6 (Est.)
China Fighter Aircraft 1984 20 (Est.)
China Main Battle Tanks 1984 100 (Est.)
China Tank Guns 1984 100 (Est.)
Switzerland Trainer Aircraft 1984 35 (Est.)
Syria Surf-Surf Missile 1984 40 (Est.)
United Kingdom Landing Ship 1984 1
China Fighter Aircraft 1985 23 (Est.)
China Main Battle Tanks 1985 100 (Est.)
China Tank Guns 1985 100 (Est.)
China Surf-Air Missile 1985 218 (Est.)
Israel Air-Air Missile 1985 150 (Est.)
North Korea Surf-Air Missile 1985 60 (Est.)
Syria Surf-Surf Missile 1985 48 (Est.)
United Kingdom Landing Ship 1985 1
United Kingdom Support Ship 1985 1
China Fighter Aircraft 1986 29 (Est.)
China Main Battle Tanks 1986 100 (Est.)
China Tank Guns 1986 100 (Est.)
China Surf-Air Missile 1986 218 (Est.)
Israel Air-Air Missile 1986 150 (Est.)
North Korea Fighter Aircraft 1986 30 (Est.)
South Korea Landing Ship 1986 3
Libya Surf-Surf Missile 1986 12 (Est.)
Syria Surf-Surf Missile 1986 48 (Est.)
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YEAR OF NUMBER
SUPPLIER EQUIPMENT DELIVERY DELIVERED
United States Anti-Tank Missile 1986 2008 (Est.)
United States Surf-Air Missile 1986 235 (Est.)
Afghanistan Surf-Air Missile 1987 9 (Est.)
China Fighter Aircraft 1987 19 (Est.)
China Main Battle Tanks 1987 120 (Est.)
China Ship-Ship Missile 1987 212 (Est.)
China Anti-tank Missile 1982-87 5000 (Est.)
China Surf-Air Missile 1987 300 (Est.)
Czechoslovakia Armored Pers Carr 1987 400 (Est.)
Libya Surf-Surf Missile 1987 12 (Est.)
North Korea Tank Guns 1983-87 360 (Est.)
North Korea Surf-Surf Missile 1987 6 (Est.)
North Korea Ship-Ship Missile 1988 7 (Est.)
[Refs. 19:p. 14 ; 20:p. 224; 21:p. 216; 22:p. 317; 23:p.
241; 24:p. 400; 25:pp. 381-382; 26:pp. 249-250; 27: pp. 231-
232]
While the above-listed numbers of received arms are the
best estimates of Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute researchers, U.S. government officials dispute the
deliveries of any fighter aircraft to Iran.5 And it is
noted that no F-4/5/14 parts or entire aircraft are
mentioned in this listing. The only American-manufactured
equipment mentioned includes the I-HAWK and TOW missiles
delivered to Iran in 1986 as part of the "Irangate" arms-
for-hostages plan that continues to cause such turmoil even
at this date. [Refs. 15:pp. 1-2; 28:pp. 1,4] This lack of
markets for spare parts to their U.S.-made equipment forced
Iran to cannibalize their equipment for parts, and to mount
an aggressive illegal exporting effort. While it is
impossible to know what illegal exports went undetected by
5. Interview with U.S. Government officials, 30
January 1989.
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U.S. Customs agents on to Iran, most U.S. government sources
do not think that any sizeable quantities of items reached
Iran. But it was well known that Iran was desperate to
acquire F-4/5/14 parts, Varian tubes and other delicate
components for her radar systems, TOW and HAWK missiles, all
varieties of U.S. air-to-air missiles, and tank parts. Her
success at obtaining these items was less than she desired,
since Iran was unable to keep enough military spares on hand
to continue her war effort effectively by February 1988.
[Refs. 7:p. 10; 29:pp. 86-87; 30:p. 2; 31:p. 4]6
In summary, Iran had mainly U.S.-manufactured weapons
systems upon her entry into the war with Iraq. Although she
initially had sufficient spare parts to maintain these
systems, the consequences of war and normal obsolescence of
equipment caused Iran to need resupply of military arms
spare parts by 1981 or 1982. Iran did not have a highly
developed manufacturing capability and could not produce her
own spare parts for sophisticated weapons systems. Other
nations began refusing to sell her parts and equipment after
watching her revolution unfold and the illegal hostage
taking of American embassy workers by revolutionary
students. Therefore Iran was forced to steal and illegally
export parts from the United States for her U.S. weapons
systems. It is generally believed that only small shipments
6. Interviews with U.S. Government official, 30-31
January, 1989, 01 February 1989, 03 February 1989.
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of U.S. parts reached Iran, and that these at best only
delayed the inevitable collapse of her war machine. While
Iran was always able to keep at least a few F-4s, F-5s, and
F-14s flying, and while she could always put tanks in the
field for her offenses, the overall numbers of operational
combat aircraft, tanks, and missile systems continued to
drop throughout the war. It was, in part, this continued
decline in military capability that forced Iran to accept
the U.N.-inspired cease fire effective on 20 August 1988.
[Ref. 8:p. 7]7
7. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January 1989 and 03 February 1989.
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III. METHODS USED TO ILLEGALLY TRANSFER
MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAN
A. SOURCES OF DATA
One of the objectives of this research is to improve
upon the ability to analyze the phenomenon of illegal arms
exports. In this chapter we explore the methods uncovered
through the court cases occurring to this point.
Information gleaned from court records when assimilated with
data collected by other sources may illuminate common
characteristics or patterns of illegal exports which may
impede U.S. national security interests, complicate threat
analyses and arm current/potential adversaries.
To appreciate the scope, character, and impact of the
illegal arms traffic... one must begin virtually from
scratch, building an analysis of the trade through
examining those transactions that for whatever reason have
been intercepted by government officials or have otherwise
come to public attention. [Ref. 9:p. 18]
Since 1981, the Justice Department has defined 45 cases
as significant export control violations in which Iran was
to be the ultimate destination of military hardware. Over
half of the illicit shipments consisted of aircraft and/or
related components; or missiles and/or related components.
Other categories included: tank parts, radios, protective
suits, propellants and mustard gas chemicals.
The litigation chosen for case study is a sample of
cases which occurred throughout the embargo period. The
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cases describe illegal exports from 1979 to the present.
The type of weaponry depicted in the court cases reflects
the two primary categories, tank and aircraft parts, with
one case involving general military hardware.
With the exception of the summary section, where an
interview with a special agent of U.S. Customs Service
provided additional material, the data in this chapter are
taken from court records. 1 By examining a representative
sample of the U.S. Department of Justice Export Control
Enforcement Unit's significant export control cases it will
become apparent that characteristics and similarities can be
obtained. Of 37 cases involving the illegal export of
munitions to Iran during the period January 1, 1981 to April
26, 1988, five cases will be cited. Difficulties obtaining
additional case data is explained at Appendix C.
B. SAMPLE CASES
Date Invest.
Indicted Cases Charges AQency
11/84 U.S. v. Hanley, Attempting to export Cus
et al. radar tubes to Iran
Arms Export Con- without the required
trol Act license and various
Southern District fraud counts.
of California
1. In order to maintain authenticity and convey the
type of format and verbiage used in court documents, little
literary interpretation was employed in the writing of the




Indicted Cases Charges Agency
6/85 U.S. v. Kazem Conspiracy to export Cus
Zamani military equipment--




7/85 U.S. v. Saeid Sixty-one count Cus
Asefi Inanlou, indictment charging
et al. that group exported
Arms Export Con- stolen F-14 parts
trol Act through England to
Theft of Gov't Iran. Parts valued
Property at $650,000 seized
ITSP by Customs, over $10
Wire Fraud million worth of
Souther Dis- parts stolen and
trict of illegally exported.
California
4/86 U.S. v. Hassan Conspiracy to export Cus
Kangarloo, et large quantity of
al. military hardware to
Arms Export Con- Iran and export of
trol Act $180,000 worth of
Central Dis- radio control devices
trict of intended for Iran
California which were seized by
British authorities.
1/89 U.S. v. Ken Unlicensed export of Cus
Park, aka Kwan aircraft, missile,
Tark and tank parts to





C. DEFINITION OF INDICTMENT COUNTS
In order to fully understand the allegations of the
cases and thoroughly acknowledge the implications of the
crimes represented, one must be cognizant of the legal
interpretation of the violations. The definitions of the
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two primary counts, illegal export and conspiracy, are taken
from the judge's instructions to the jury in the Zamani
case. [Ref. 33] The judge described illegal export as the
export or attempt to export items on the United States
Munitions List: (1) without first obtaining a license for
such export or (2) otherwise in violation of law. The
Government must also prove that the items referred to in the
indictment were on the United States Munitions List. 2 In
order to be included on the Munitions List an item must fit
into one of the following categories: [Ref. 33]
- Electronic equipment assigned a military designation;
- Components, parts, accessories, attachments, and
associated equipment specifically designed for use or
currently used with electronic equipment assigned a
military designation;
- Components, parts, accessories, attachments, and
associated equipment specifically designed for use or
currently used with tracking, imaging, or moving target
indication radar systems assigned a military designation
or specifically designed, modified, or configured for
military application;
- Aircraft, including helicopters, designed, modified, or
equipped for military purposes, including but not
limited to the following: gunnery, bombing, rocket or
missile launching, reconnaissance;
- Military aircraft engines specifically designed or
modified for such aircraft.
2. For additional information on the establishment,
types and contents of export lists, see U.S. Military Sales
and Assistance Programs: Laws. Regulations, and Procedures,
Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Arms Control,
International Security and Science of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July
23, 1985, p. 5.
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If items fall only within the second or third category
above and are in normal commercial use, no license is
required for export.
The judge defined "export" as the sending or taking of
defense goods or items out of the United States in any
manner.
In order to prove conspiracy the judge explained that
the Government must prove that the defendant and at least
one co-conspirator knew the conspirators' plans to export
items on the Munitions list would, if successful, violate
some law of the United States. The participants must be
intentional not merely spectators to the criminal activity.
D. A REVIEW OF THE CASES
1. U.S. v. Hanley, et al., November 1984 [Ref. 34]
Iranian by birth, Yasser Shooshtary is a resident
alien of the U.S. Prior to coming to the U.S., he lived in
England, where, while working as a banker, he met a wealthy
Iranian named Amir Mansour who wanted to buy weapons for
Iran. Mansour's shopping list included radar equipment,
nuclear weapons and bombs. Knowing Shooshtary was intending
to immigrate to the U.S., Mansour wanted him to negotiate
the purchase of weapons for export to Iran and other
countries (including Iraq).
Upon arriving in the U.S. in September of 1983,
Shooshtary briefly owned a San Diego firm, Border Software.
He retained the company for only six months before selling
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at a loss. After a short visit to England, Shooshtary tried
to buy radar tubes from the new owner of Border Software for
illegal export. Shooshtary provided the proprietor with
model and stock numbers of the items he wished to acquire.
A British holding company was the intended recipient of the_
exported components. A third party notified the Federal
Bureau of Investigation of the attempted purchase. The FBI
told U.S. Customs of the allegations, who proceeded with the
investigations.
Customs placed a video-recorder in the business in
order to film Shooshtary asking for the specified parts.
Shooshtary was to receive $5,000 for the delivery of the
components which were to be sold to Iran for an estimated
$90,000.
A Customs agent, Dan Supneck, went "undercover" to
further implicate the remainder of the conspirators. At
this point Hanley, as an employee of T.M.G. Hanley, Ltd, the
British holding firm, made an urgent request for tank and
vehicle parts and two new radar tubes to be sold to Iran.
These tubes were to be sold to Iran for $294,000. He told
the undercover Customs agent (who assumed the alias Dan
Stern) that the equipment was to be exported to a "safe"
country in Europe for diversion to Iran. Within two weeks
Stern received a written order for the radar tube and a list
of four freight forwarders in Europe who worked with and
were approved by the Iranians for the diversion. Stern's
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initial payoff was to take place upon delivery in Europe,
with the balance forwarded upon the shipment reaching Iran.
Hanley told Stern to ship the components via
Intrarsco Transport and Speditions, GmbH, a West German
freight company; however, in an exhibit of a telephone
conversation with Stern, Fanley also mentioned Switzerland
as a possible route. Additionally, Stern was instructed to
label the crates as x-ray tubes or desalinization equipment,
neither of which would require a license or likely be
inspected by Custms.
During this time Stern received from Hanley a 32-
page shopping list of required spare parts for subsequent
delivery to Iran. Concurrently, Hanley offered the use of
his company for the "laundering" of any money at Stern's
discretion.
Stern persuaded Hanley to come to the U.S. to pay
him $10,000 in "good faith" money. At this time Hanley was
arrested for conspiring to illegally export items on the
Munitions List and various fraud counts.
2. U.S. v. Kazem Zamani, June 1985
The U.S. Government contends that Zamani and co-
conspirators attempted to export items on the Munitions List
in violation of current statutes. Allegations drawn from
the judge's instructions to the jury indicate the Zamani
plotted to export goods from the state of Maryland to
England from April 5, 1984 to November, 1984. [Ref. 33]
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A memorandum offered during an application for an
order authorizing the interception of Telex communications
details the accounts which led to Zamani's indictment.
[Ref. 33] In this official document, the Assistant Attorney
General delineates the reasons for the solicited
interception by describing the suspected circumstances of
the case. Working undercover, Customs agents, with the help
of a confidential source, were asked by Zamani to supply
military hardware for shipment to Iran through London. This
shipment would transpire without export licenses, which
Zamani was aware would be needed for the export of such
items. The memorandum further states that Zamani regularly
receives telex messages from his principals in London.
Further data can be drawn from an affidavit by
Thomas D. Baumgardner, Senior Special Agent of the U.S.
Customs Service assigned to the Baltimore Office of
Investigations. [Ref. 33] This affidavit was supplied to
the court in regards to authorization to intercept telex
communications. In the record Agent Baumgardner offers
these facts of the case:
- On April 9, 1984, the FBI advised Customs that an
Iranian named Kazem Zamani approached a confidential
source on April 5, 1984. Zamani gave the source a six-
page list of various electronic parts that he wanted as
soon as possible.
- On April 6, 1984, the sourc(e learned that a VA145E is a
Varian Corporation electron tube used for the TPS43
ground-based radar system manufactured by Westinghouse,
and that most of the electronics parts listed are for
use on Cobra attack helicopters.
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- On April 7, 1984, Zamani informed the source that these
parts were to be sent to a man in London who intends to
transship the articles to Iran.
- On April 12, 1984, Customs Agent George Lacey contacted
Customs Service, Operations Exodus Command Center and
requested Department of State and Department of Commerce
export license determinations on the parts requested by
Zamani.
- On April 17, 1984, Operations Exodus Command Center
responded to Lacey's inquiry by stating that the radar
tubes were a component on the Munitions List; however,
the helicopter parts' status would depend upon their
application, which could not be determined.
- On April 17, 1984, Lacey, operating undercover and
wearing a concealed radio transmitter, met with Zamani.
During this meeting and subsequent encounters, Zamani
was made aware of the licensing requirements for the
export of military hardware. Zamani stated that no
license would be obtained and offered suggestions to
circumvent detection by Customs, such as false invoicing
of the items and hiring a private aircraft or boat to
transport the items to London. Zamani further suggested
that small items be placed in suitcases and then carried
out of the U.S. He further reiterated that the items he
wanted were to eventually be delivered to Iran. He also
informed the undercover agent of his business associates
in London and of his telex and telephonic communications
with them. His confederates would supply him with the
shopping lists and the necessary funds at time of
purchase.
- On June 7, 1984, Zamani informed Lacey of a misunder-
standing with the buyers in London and his decision to
seek a new purchaser in Iran.
- On June 26, 1984, Zamani informed Lacey of a new buyer
in Iran and that he had received a telex message from
Iran requesting a list of items.
- On June 27, 1984, Lacey met with Zamani. At this time
Zamani told him to supply the parts that could fit in
suitcases and not to do anything with the larger parts.
- On July 6, 1984, Lacey mailed to Zamani a list of the
military equipment that he could furnish.
- On August 8, 1984, Zamani met with agents Lacey and
Ynutter and stated that he had set up a small company in
London to transship the items to Iran.
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3. U.S. v. Saeid Asefi Inan ?ou, et al., July 1985
This case, referred to earlier in this thesis, not
only involves illegal export and conspiracy, but the
penetration of the Department of Defense supply system. The
following information on this case comes from the
indictment, case number CR-85-000631, dated July 24, 1985,
of the Southern District of California, San Diego. [Ref.
35]
Beginning at least as early as January 1981 and
continuing until July 1985, the defendants and others
conspired to steal and ship military aircraft equipment from
the U.S. They illegally obtained U.S. Naval equipment,
Defense Logistic Agency microfiche control indexes and
pictures of F-14 combat aircraft.
As a warehouse worker at the San Diego Naval Fleet
Avionics Logistics Support Center, Quito stole Government
material. Rodriguez and Cayabyab were Naval personnel
assigned to Belleau Wood and Kitty Hawk, respectively. They
used their positions to penetrate Naval security in order to
steal various aircraft armaments.
Inanlou and the Agustins transshipped the stolen
parts from San Diego and Los Angeles to New York City, to be
exported using the fictitious companies Pierre Walter, Ltd.,
and Ward International, allegedly located in California.
In order to conceal the illicit export, Inanlou and
the Agustins falsified Shipper's Export Declarations (SED),
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shipping documents, and other records by, among other
things, understating the value of the stolen parts and be
declaring them to be either "medical supplies" or
"automobile parts."
Inanlou, an Iranian citizen residing in England,
used his position as the corporate director of Security Aids
International (SAI) to illegally obtain armaments and
transship them to Iran via England. Inanlou also did
business as Chandler Trading, also known as Chandler, Ltd
and Chandler which was used in the conspiracy as a conduit
for the stolen components.
Other items obtained and exported without a license
by the conspiracy were: parametric amplifiers used to guide
the Phoenix Missile System, gimbal assemblies for inertial
navigation systems, gas turbine fuel controls, multi-plex
filters, weapon indicator controls, power supplies, an
infrared recorder which is a part of the Tactical Air
Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) and signal data and angle
of attack computers.
The following sequence of events was listed in the
indictment.
- Approximately January 3, 1981, Rodriguez was telegraphed
$2,000 from Franklin Agustin.
- On April 14, 1981, Inanlou ordered aircraft parts from
Franklin Agustin.
- Shipments of various weights, composed of stolen
aircraft parts, were sent by the Agustins, utilizing the
fictitious entity, P. Walter, to Chandler Trading,
United Kingdom, on April 13, 1982; February 7, 1983;
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September 9, 1983; February 14, 1984; and February 12,
1985. In addition to the above shipments, the Agustins
shipped two cartons of stolen aircraft parts from San
Diego to New York City under the name "Ward Internation-
al" on December 18, 1984. All told there were 26 known
shipments totalling $2.5 million in value. Appendix D
lists the specific thefts, value of items stolen, and
the dates the items were allegedly exported without the
necessary licenses to Iran via England. [Ref. 35]
- Additional indictments assert that on October 30, 1984,
and December 11, 1984, the defendants falsified the SED
by stating that the contents of the shipment were auto
parts, when they actually were the stolen parts.
- Additional court documents indicate that the Government
possessed approximately 15,000 pages of evidence for the
trial of these defendants.
4, U.S. v. Hassan KanQarloo, et al., April 1986
The Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for New Trial; Memorandum; Declaration provided the basic
facts of this case. [Ref. 36] The following information is
solely from that document filed on December 5, 1986 by
Robert C. Bonner, United States Attorney.
Hassan Kangarloo is an Iranian citizen with
permanent legal resident status in the U.S. Throughout the
period 1982 to 1985 he worked in association with an import-
export company called General Commodity (B.C.) Ltd., which
had offices in the U.S., Canada, England and Switzerland.
In the context of General Commodity, Kangarloo served as a
dealer of military equipment for sale to Iran.
It is documented that Kangarloo in his dealings with
various clients often used aliases (e.g., Henry Ian),
misrepresented his status (e.g., agent for the government of
Austria), misrepresented the end-user of military articles
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(e.g., West Germany), and used fictitious company names
(e.g., Universal Electronics and Rubber Company).
On April 6, 1986, he was arrested as he and his wife
attempted to enter the country from Canada under false
pretenses.
Kangarloo thus served as a conduit for illegal
exports. The suppliers of the military goods may not have
known and/or cared where their wares would ultimately be
delivered.
5. U.S. v. Ken Park, aka Kwan Park, January 1989
The following information is from an affidavit of
David K. Harris, a criminal investigator with the U.S.
Customs Service, filed pursuant to the indictment of this
case. [Ref. 37] This particular case displays Iran's
continuing desire for military parts although the conflict
with Iraq has ended.
On June 16, 1988, Customs was contacted by the
Contracts Administrator of Pacific Scientific Advanced
Technology Group, HTL Division (HTL) of a suspicious sales
order her company received. The order, from Ken H. Park of
Ellin International, Sunnyvale, CA, was for 32 fire
extinguishers designed for use on F-14 fighter aircraft.
Park told HTL that the equipment was for export to Korea.
On June 28, 1988, Customs learned from HTL that
Ellin International bought four bellows assemblies
(components for the canopy seal regulator of F-14 aircraft)
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on January 27, 1988. The purchase order stated the parts
were for resale and export. In October, 1988, HTL informed
Park of the need for an export license for the F-14 fire
extinguishers. HTL reiterated the licensing requirement in
December.
Further investigation revealed that as Director of
Foreign Procurement for Universal Technology International,
Ken Park requested a price quote for F-14 aircraft parts
from Haskon Corporation, Taunton, MA, in 1985. The request
for the quotation from Haskon originated from Cavanna PTE
Ltd., in Singapore.
In a license determination dated August 10, 1988,
the Office of Munitions Control licensing officer stated
that the U.S. and Iran were the only two nations operating
the F-14 aircraft, thus any export was probably going to
Iran.
A study of Customs case files revealed that Ken
Park, acting as the Export Manager of Universal Technology,
was involved in illegal export of aircraft parts to South
Korea in August, 1980. Universal Technology paid an
administrative fine for the violation. Customs identified
the same individual as the owner of Ellin International.
Using an electronic tracking device placed inside
five boxes containing five F-14 fire extinguishers delivered
to Ellin International, Customs was able to record the path
taken by the parcels.
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On January 10, 1989, Custom electronically scanned
the Ellin warehouse for a positive reading of the hidden
device, but received a negative reading.
A shipper's export declaration (SED) indicating that
Ellin International exported drill twists, bit screw drives
and parts and hardware for trucks and tractors was obtained
by Customs on January 11, 1989. The goods were ultimately
shipped via Japan Airlines to Cavanna PTE, Ltd., Singapore
on January 8, 1989. The SED stated that the products are to
be exported G-Dest., meaning they do not require a license
to be exported. Further Customs review showed no exports by
Ellin International to Korea.
Through a confidential informant, the Customs
Attache in Singapore learned that the entire Ellin
International shipment which had originated from San
Francisco International airport was awaiting transshipment
to Teheran, Iran.
On January 13, 1939, Ken Park admitted illegally
exporting aircraft parts purchased from HTL.
This case not only shows Iran's continuing want and
need of U.S. military hardware, but the shift from European
intermediaries to those in the Far East.
E. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE
One can readily identify some common entities of illegal
arms transfers by a review of the sample cases: (1) parts,
not entire weapons systems are the predominant illegally
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exported items; (2) the violators are typically common,
ordinary people, not prominent or well-known in the arms
trade business; (3) an intermediate country is used as a
conduit; (4) falsified documents are often used to
facilitate export; (5) shipping cartons are mislabeled or
goods are carried out in luggage to conceal fraudulent
exports; and (6) offenders' sentences are relatively light.
However minute subtleties which are not reflected in
court records may further illuminate the world of illicit
arms dealings. An interview with a U.S. Customs Service
Special Agent who asked to remain anonymous provides clarity
and verifies conclusions drawn from case studie. [Ref. 38]
Each of the sample cases used an intermediate European
nation to act as a conduit for transshipment to Iran.
Europeans or Iranians residing in Europe have been the
middlemen for the transactions. The Customs official
related that initially Iranians dealt directly with U.S.
firms or individuals, but later preferred to insulate
themselves from possible prosecution. The Europeans are now
becoming nervous, and it is believed that future transac-
tions may center around Far Eastern countries. The recent
indictment in which Ken Park allegedly illegally shipped
parts of Sidewinder and Hawk missiles and fire extinguishers
used on F-14 fighter planes to Singapore with an ultimate
destination of Iran is a primary example of new intermediary
countries.
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Foreign nations are relatively safe havens for
conspirators for many reasons. As most countries look upon
illegal exports to embargoed nations as political conduct,
not a violation of criminal law, extradition is not usually
granted. In the same vein, these nations seldom prosecute
those individuals or corporations which use their nation as
a stepping stone to a third country. As evidenced in the
Hanley case, certain countries, such as England, West
Germany, Italy and Switzerland were considered "safer" than
others.
A frequent defense of military suppliers is their
professed ignorance of the final destination of their goods.
When making deals they do not want to know where the
military hardware is really going. In a Sdn Diego case, the
defendant, Floyd Stilwell, was indicted for trying to
illegally export military equipment he purchased from
Teledyne Corporation. As the president of Marsh Aviation,
Stilwell attempted to export a military aircraft navigation
system to Iran via West Germany. Although the Government
claims he was aware of the transshipment to Iran, he
asserted he did not know and did not want to know or ask
about the end-user.
Misidentifying the end-user is but one way to falsify
export documents. The Inanlou case is an example of
claiming to export commercial-use products when in actuality
defense items are shipped. Another way to circumvent export
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laws is under-valuating the export. Declaring items of
value less than $2.000 precludes licensing procedures.
Another common thread among the sample cases is the
mislabeling of the shipping cartons. The Special Agent
pointed out that an export inspector must know what he is
looking at before he can determine the contents are not as
documented. In his words "if you don't know what a truck
part looks like how can you tell a truck part from an
aircraft component." The Agent also readily admits that not
all shipments are inspected. Those which seem to be
innocent enough may get through unopened.
Requests for cost quotes are often sent from intermedi-
aries in London or Dusseldorf to arms brokerage houses in
the U.S. Iran had "wish lists," computer printouts of
specific items, including model identification and part
numbers. Unconcerned or uneducated individuals or companies
would respond and ultimately ship the desired parts. Some
corporations, aware of the potential for illicit exports,
such as the Varian corporation in the Hanley case, alerted
authorities when suspicious requests were received. The
Customs agent maintained that 99 per cent of U.S. corpora-
tions know their product and their potential buyers and that
when someone alien to them seeks a sensitive component or
system the corporation can do one of three things: "tell
him to take a hike," do business with him, or alert
authorities. Most companies use the first approach. Yet as
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profits dwindle due to Defense budget cut-backs and
competition from Third World nations escalates, more
companies may be willing to do some "questionable" dealings
than previously.
An important aspect which court documents do not
elucidate is the motive for the individuals involved in
illicit arms trade. It can be surmised by the amount of
unchallenged profits which this black market produces that
greed is the primary determinant. The Iranian middlemen
played on the capitalist dogma of profit at any expense.
Many of the violators are now in jail, the Agent surmised,
because greed ultimately outweighed common sense and a dumb
action led to their downfall. It can be safely assumed that
those Navy men convicted in the Inanlou case stole govern-
ment property for personal gain, not to enhance Iran's war-
fighting position.
Questions arise concerning the effects of the Iran-
Contra affair on apprehension and prosecution of suspects.
Little can be directly inferred from the sampled cases;
however, the Customs agent had a few comments about the
deleterious consequences upon litigation. Before a
prosecutor will agree to try a case, uncontrovertible
evidence must show that the defendant knew the Government
was not involved. Such proof usually takes the form of a
taped conversation or written acknowledgement. Prior to
"Irangate" it was never questioned, it was taken for granted
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that the government was not a participant in the scheme. In
his request for an appeal, Kangarloo contends that his acts
of illegal exports could not have negatively affected
national security if the President authorized shipments to
Iran. The U.S. Attorney answers this disagreement with the
fact that the Arms Export Control Act, for which Kangarloo
was convicted, is a regulatory act, and the failure to
obtain a license prior to the export of U.S. Munitions List
items is illegal, regardless of whether a license would have
been granted if sought.
The concluding common aspect to the sample cases is the
comparatively light sentences. The anonymous Customs agent
feels this is due to the lack of infamy stolen parts elicits
from the public. It does not appear as foreboding to
illegally export parts as opposed to entire weapon systems.
U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf and the Iran-Contra
affair has done little to change adjudication patterns.
Table 1 demonstrates the sentencing patterns of the cases
delineated in this chapter. These statistics are taken from
the U.S. Department of Justice's Significant Export Control
Case list. [Ref. 32:pp. 15,18,20,26]
The illegal export of military hardware is looked upon
as a "white collar" criminal act, thus jail terms and
sentencing remain relatively light in terms of the impact
the criminal acts may generate, according to the Customs
agent. Prosecutois are promoting heavier fines and stiffer
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TABLE 1
DISPOSITIONS OF SAMPLE CASES
Case Defendant Disposition
U.S. v. Hanley, Hanley 3 years imprisonment






Hanley, Ltd. Foreign National
Central Lloyds Foreign National
Intrarsco Transport Foreign Defendant




U.S. v. Inanlou, Inanlou Fugitive
et al. E. Agustin 18 years imprisonment
F. Agustin 13 years imprisonment
J. Agustin 5 years imprisonment
G. Agustin 1 year imprisonment
Quito 1 year imprisonment
Rodriguez 5 years imprisonment
Cayabyab 6 years imprisonment
D. Wheeler 2 years imprisonment
V. Wheeler 2 years imprisonment
All plead guilty
U.S. v. Kangarloo, Kangarloo 3 years imprisonment
et al. Guilty plea
U.S. v. Park Park Trial pending
jail sentences, yet the scope and possible repercussions
from these criminal deeds have yet to stir public opinion,
and thus influence legislators.
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One may point out that many defendants in the Inanlou
case received harsh punishment, but none received the
maximum allowed under the law and none were fined.
Considering the vast amount of property stolen and the
combined value of the pilfered components, some may argue
that the profit is well worth the risks incurred.
In conclusion, although each case has its own
idiosyncracies, common traits readily emerge. Knowing these
patterns may aid detection of illegal transfer, yet in the
eyes of the Customs official, deterrence is essential if the
number of unlawful exports is to be limited. Educating
businessmen/women to these patterns and playing to their
higher moral standards would nip this illegal activity in
the bud. Criminologists suggest swift and sure punishment
of offenders as the only true deterrent; this is where
intelligence agencies can play a part. By providing law
enforcement agencies with data gained from their expertise
and unique capabilities, intelligence analysts can reap the
benefits of their knowledge of what weaponry may have been
delivered clandestinely to whom, where and how.
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IV. EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAN
A. FREQUENCY OF ILLEGAL EXPORT ATTEMPTS
It has been documented throughout this paper that
Iranians were actively engaged in the illegal exporting of
U.S. military arms and parts to Iran, directly and through
paid agents. By 1988, over 100 cases of illegal arms
exports to Iran were being investigated by the U.S. Customs
Service. U.S. Customs on the average turned over 30 Iranian
illegal export cases per year to the U.S. Justice Department
for prosecution. [RefS. 29:pp. 86-87; 39:p. 10; 40:p. 1]
Included in the U.S. Department of Justice's recent list of
significant export control cases were 48 entries involving
Iran out of a total number of 185 cases. All but four of
these Iranian cases involved the illegal export of arms or
military parts. [Ref. 32:pp. 1-39] Having documented a
determined Iranian initiative to obtain illegally exported
U.S. arms and parts, we now turn to the question of the
effects of these illegal transfers of military equipment.
It is obvious that the potential benefit was significant.
If real benefits were not obtained, then the excessive
monetary and political costs would have prohibited continued
efforts at illegal export--but this was not evidenced.
This review of the effects resulting from Iran's receipt
of illegally exported U.S. arms and parts will discuss four
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varied categories of effects. These areas will include:
(1) increased operational periods for Iranian equipment/
prolonged capacity for Iran to wage war with Iraq, (2) the
general need for exploiting foreign technical expertise
concerning sophisticated weaponry, (3) the ability to
determine Iran's future war plans from her imports, and (4)
the threat to American national security.
B. INCREASED OPERATIONAL STATUS OF IRANIAN WEAPONS SYSTEMS
One of the less pleasant realities of high technology
weapons systems is their continuing requirement for
maintenance and an ample supply of spare parts. Weapons
systems and their component parts, like all mechanical
devices, have service lives that when exhausted, require
parts replacement or else the system becomes non-
operational. In a normal operational environment, there is
a constant replenishment of spare parts to ensure that all
equipment can remain in an operational status. The Iranian
supply system was not a "normal" operational environment,
because many of its required spare parts were available only
from nations restricting their military sales to Iran. As a
worst case example, F-14 spare parts were only available
from the United States, and America had placed an embargo on
all defense sales to Iran. With these restrictions on
Iran's receipt of much needed spare parts, the Iranian
response was to illegally import the needed items. What was
the effect of these illegally received parts?
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There are two basic ways in which parts can be provided
for a non-operational piece of equipment: (1) the parts may
be obtained from a manufacturer or seller, and (2) the parts
may be "cannibalized" from another similar type of equipment
for replacement on the non-operational gear. In the first
case, any parts received will theoretically create an
operational piece of gear from a non-operational one. In
the second case, with cannabilization, an already non-
operational piece of gear is further degraded through the
loss of additional components to make a non-operational
piece of gear operational. In a worse example, an opera-
tional piece of gear may be rendered non-operational in
order to place another piece of equipment into an
operational status. This situation could occur when
operational equipment at one location is not expecting use,
while non-operational equipment at another location is
required for use. In this case the unused asset could give
up its functioning parts to place the needed equipment into
an operational status.
Iran was forced to utilize cannibalization to keep her
U.S. military aircraft flying because not enough parts were
received through either legal or illegal channels to satisfy
all the needs. [Refs. 41 :p. 151; 42:p. 54] As mentioned
previously, Iran was always able to maintain operational F-
4/5/14 aircraft, tanks, and artillery. But because
insufficient spares were arriving through illegal exports,
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the continuation of the war saw a constant decline
especially in the number of operational aircraft.1 Because
of the successful American embargo of Varian tubes, a vital
component of the HAWK air defense system, government
officials believe that most of this system became non-
operational in 1982, with the remaining operational units
being preserved in case of future massive air attacks.2
Therefore, in the case of Iran, not enough needed parts
were delivered through illegal exports to maintain even a
level inventory of operational aircraft and air defense
units. But while their effect was not significant enough to
maintain level inventories of arms, the receipt of these
parts did raise some equipment from non-operational into an
operational status. While this inadequate repair program
could not create a war-winning weapons inventory, it did
increase the operational status of Iranian equipment.
Iran was forced to consider a ceasefire because of her
inability to receive adequate shipments of arms and
replacement pal..s. [Ref. 8:p. 7] However, she persevered
for nearly eight years in spite of an American embargo that
prevented the legal export of defense materials. Most
interviewed government officials agreed that illegally
exported U.S. aircraft parts enabled Iran to keep her
1. Interview with U.S. Government officials, 03
February 1989.
2. Interview with U.S. Government official, 30 January
1989.
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F-4/5/14 aircraft flying. Illegally received parts were
essential for maintaining Iran's tanks during the war.
Illegally exported U.S. TOW and air-to-air missiles were
critical to Iran's anti-tank and anti-air warfare.3
The net effect of these illegal arms and parts exports
was to allow Iran to fight longer than if she would not have
received them. While the parts receipts were not sufficient
to keep operational equipment inventories at even a non-
declining level, they did give Iran an increased inventory
of operational weapons systems over what she would have
possessea without these received parts. These parts did not
enable Iran to win her war, but they did allow her to fight
a while longer.
C. EXPLOITING FOREIGN TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
The U.S. weapons systems purchased by Iran under the
Shah's leadership were among the most technically
sophisticated in existence at the time of their purchase.
These arms contained delicate and exacting components that
required precision placement and adjustments. Routine
maintenance was required to ensure these "high tech" pieces
of equipment would continue functioning in the intended
manner. As it does with all legitimate purchasers of its
equipment, the United States had sent teams of technicians
3. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 31
January 1989, 03 February 1989.
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to Iran to train the Iranian maintenance experts. However,
initially having large numbers of Americans present to
assist with aircraft, air defense, and missile system
maintenance, the question arises as to Iran's ability to
perform this "delicate" maintenance on sophisticated weapons
systems after the Americans departed Iran. Iran's situation
reauired experienced technicians because of the increased
need for weapons' maintenance and repair due to combat
losses. Also she quickly depleted her spare parts, making
correct installations with the few available spare parts a
necessity. If Iran would have enjoyed an unlimited
availability of spare parts, she could have "experimented"
with maintenance until her technicians learned to do the
work properly.
The experience level of Iranian technicians was a
difficult question to be confidently answered by government
observers of the war. If it could have been proven that the
Iranians did not possess sufficient skills to repair
sophisticated equipment even when they possessed the
required parts, then a recruiting of foreign technical
experts would have been expected. At the very beginning of
the Iranian Revolution, Iran offered employment to
maintenance personnel from former U.S. companies operating
in her country, but received no favorable responses. After
these rebuffs, no other known attempts to recruit foreign
technical expertise occurred as a growing Islamic pride
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rejected all forms of American and, to a lesser degree,
Western presence. The Iranians seemed determined to perform
all of their maintenance by themselves to the best of their
abilities. And as the war wore on and America continued to
influence world opinion against Iran, it was doubtful that
foreign maintenance technicians would have been trusted with
Iran's precious weapons systems.4
While no confidence was expressed in the widespread
expertise level of Iranian technicians, U.S. government
officials were unanimous in stating that Iran had enough
competent technicians to repair all types of equipment in
their military weapons inventory. The opinion was expressed
that while not all of the maintenance efforts might be
successes, some of them would be. An example was cited
concerning an Iranian aircraft overhaul and maintenance
facility that indicated some aircraft entering the facility
would emerge successfully "overhauled" while others would
not. That some emerged successfully overhauled reflected an
existing Iranian maintenance expertise.5 These qualified
technicians were used to train the smartest available high
school and college graduates in their maintenance skills--
4. Interviews with U.S. Government officials, 30
January 1989, 30-31 January 1989, and 03 February 1989.
5. Interview with U.S. Government officials, 03
February 1989.
70
thus keeping all maintenance in the hands of Iranians and
not "suspect" foreigners. 6
Therefore it is agreed that in the Iranian case there
was not an exploitation, or recruitment, of foreign
maintenance experts. This decision on Iran's part appeared
to reflect a religious or national consciousness that would
not permit a foreign presence to influence them or dilute
their singlemindedness. Instead Iran attempted all of her
most complicated maintenance solely with her own best-
trained technicians.
D. ILLEGAL ARMS IMPORTS AND WAR PLANS
When a nation is preparing to go to war with another
country, it will probably seek to bolster its armament
supply. Nations know that large equipment losses will occur
during combat which may not be easily replaced, and so
weapons are stockpiled beforehand to avoid this situation.
Iran, while not anticipating war but in striving to become a
first-rate Gulf power, planned to nearly double her armed
forces in the late 1970's. Iraq, probably fearing that she
would some day have to fight Iran, began rearming herself in
1977--mainly with Soviet weapons. [Ref. 14:pp. 10-11]
Intelligence analysts can predict upcoming military action
through the indicators of armaments stockpiling, increased
military exercises, and reserve mobilizations. In the same
6. Interview with U.S. Government officials, 30
January 1989.
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manner, a nation's future war plans can be determined by
identifying the types of weapons it is importing.
Addressing this idea, most interviewed government
officials expressed the view that Iran's weapons needs
throughout her war with Iraq remained the same, and that
this constancy prevented any analyst's interpretation of
Iranian future war plans.7 Some others believed that there
was a relationship between Iranian requests for parts and
their war plans, but that the Iranian parts procurement
strategy was so inefficient and disorganized that this link
was impossible to discover.8  While this inefficiency is
noted, there still existed some clues to Iranian battle
plans from both their failure to acquire certain "high tech"
parts and by their urgency in getting accelerated shipments
of "low tech" expendable supplies.
The failure of Iran to acquire large numbers of radars
and radar parts for their F-4, F-5, and F-14 aircraft, after
their existing stocks of these items were exhausted, would
tend to eliminate planning for any large-scale bombing raids
into Iraqi territory. Conversely, if Iran could have
managed to receive large quantities of these aircraft radars
and parts, then analysts would expect future Iranian air
excursions into Iraqi-held territory.
7. Interviews with U.S. Government official, 30-31
January 1989, 01 February 1989.
8. Interview with U.S. Government official, 03
February 1989.
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What was actually seen, however, was a constant need for
all types of aircraft spare parts, with at most only a
"trickle" of received parts. But the items that were
requested for accelerated delivery were shipments of small
arms and ammunition.9  These "low tech" and expendable
items were received in large quantities from unspecified
nations in legal, but usually hidden, purchases. The
acquisition of large amounts of small arms and ammunition
would alert analysts of Iranian planning for upcoming
battles. This was in fact exactly what happened.1 0 Iran
would request accelerated shipments of ammunition in advance
of her Spring and Fall offenses, which could have further
convinced analysts of planning for upcoming ground-based
fighting.
When considering land and air battles, Iran was limited
to tank, artillery, and infantry conflicts by the end of her
war. It was supplies for these forces that were most
requested, and regular offensives followed receipt of these
expendable items. Iran's future war plans were able to be
determined through her supply requests.
9. Interviews with U.S. Government official, 30-31
January 1989, 01 February 1989.
10. Interview with U.S. Government officials, 03
February 1989.
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E. IMPACT ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
The effects of illegal arms exports were as significant
to United States national security as they were to Iran's
abilities for prosecuting her war. Every part that was
stolen from the U.S. military supply system, while
potentially turning a non-operational Iranian weapon into an
operational one, also potentially retained a non-operational
U.S. weapon in its "downed" status. Because stolen parts
result in falsely inflated inventory statistics, U.S.
military supply personnel would not have reordered parts
when they actually reached critically low levels. By having
unreliable inventories of spare parts, the military's
readiness was lowered. Should the thefts have continued for
a prolonged period without detection, severely depleting
U.S. inventories, any emergency tasking that prompted
accelerated equipment/parts failures or damage could have
resulted in non-operational equipment due to lack of
replacement parts in the supply system. In this situation,
records would have falsely indicated available replacement
parts.
Such a situation could have occurred with the U.S. Naval
forces patrolling the Persian Gulf. Should air warfare have
erupted and a critical need for F-14 replacement parts
developed, the F-14 parts thefts perpetrated by the Inanlou
theft ring could possibly have prevented F-14s from being
promptly repaired. [Ref. l:p. 1] In reality, what really
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occurred was that the stolen F-14 parts were exported to
Iran, where they served to repair Iranian F-14s which then
posed a threat to U.S. ships and aircraft operating in the
Persian Gulf.
Of course the threat to Persian Gulf based American
servicemen caused by illegally exported arms was far more
complicated than simply from Iranian F-14 aircraft. U.S.
parts served to repair Iranian F-4/5 aircraft, and the
status of Iranian HAWK missile defenses was never certain.
Each of these platforms and systems could easily have
destroyed American lives and equipment. It was possible to
have made an Iranian weapons system operational for a few
thousand dollars, that later could potentially have
destroyed a billion dollar American warship. The illegally
exported U.S. military parts posed a great threat to
American national security in the Persian Gulf.
Finally, Iran's ability to acquire U.S. military parts
in spite of an American embargo against their shipment,
could have encouraged other world nations to overlook
similar difficulties in obtaining parts and to more readily
enter into armed conflicts. Iran almost made the
prosecution of a war seem too easy. With seemingly
insurmountable obstacles preventing her from obtaining
replacement parts to keep her U.S. military systems
operational, Iran consistently was able to field her tanks,
artillery, aircraft, and though questioned, possibly her air
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defense systems. Even if Iran's example did not encourage
other nations to consider war, it certainly lowered the
credibility of America's embargo and supply system security.
In all of these examples--a diminished U.S. stockpiling
of weapons and parts; a lowered U.S. military readiness; a
direct threat to U.S. Naval forces patrolling the Persian
Gulf; and encouragement to other nations considering war--
the illegal export of U.S. military parts served to threaten
U.S. national security interests.
In concluding this chapter, it should be noted that all
of the discussed effects of illegal exports of U.S. arms,
except for a lack of foreign technical expertise
exploitation, were those that seemed likely to occur. It
had seemed obvious to the researchers that any parts
received by Iran would increase the operational status of
her war equipment. What was not anticipated was that the
very limited amounts of parts received would not be
sufficient to maintain all or most of the Iranian systems.
Likewise, although these received parts did enable Iran to
prosecute her war for a longer period than if she had not
obtained them, the limited amounts of materials actually
entering Iran were not adequate to provide an unending
supply of operational weapons systems.
Because of the "high tech" nature of U.S. weapons
systems, it was expected that Iran would have attempted to
recruit foreign technicians experts in the maintenance of
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these arms. Iran did initially attempt to recruit
technicians from former U.S. companies stationed in her
country, but she resisted further recruitment after her
initial offers were declined. Muslim pride was a key reason
for Iran's depending upon their own talents and training to
repair the most sophisticated weapons systems. But,
contrary to our expectations, the Iranians had successfully
learned enough maintenance skills from their former American
teachers to repair any U.S. system in their inventory--
providing they had a supply of functional spare parts.
While most of the government officials interviewed did
not agree that Iran's requests for parts and arms reflected
her future war plans, this researcher continued to believe
that they did. Most officials pointed out that Iran's
"shopping list" for replacement parts and arms remained
almost the same throughout her war, regardless of upcoming
battles or strategies. In reality, the only items she
specifically emphasized for accelerated shipment--
ammunition and small arms requests--were the critical items
to be used in her upcoming offenses. In this example,
Iran's urgent call for shipments of ammunition were
indicative of her infantry-oriented assaults planned for the
future.
And lastly, it always seemed obvious that illegal
exports of arms to Iran posed a threat to American national
security interests. Even before U.S. Naval forces entered
77
the Persian Gulf, Iranians supported terrorism across the
world, and Americans were among their favorite targets.
Small arms and explosives could have been utilized in
Iranian perpetrations of violence, and the larger aircraft
and air defense missile system parts could have been used
against any U.S. military retaliations for Iranian terrorist
actions.
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V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS,
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Through personal interviews, review of the current
literature, and case study, several postulates have been
formulated concerning illegal arms trade to Iran during the
embargo period. Since few of the participants in the
unlawful traffic were connected to Iran either ideologically
or by birth, it is assumed monetary gain was the primary
motive. Although a large volume of munitions were illegally
exported, Iran's benefits were minimal due to her expansive
need of spare parts and the infrequency of delivery. Iran
could not rely on the transfer of specific parts when
needed, thus could not effect precise war planning, although
the request for particular parts can indicate combat
intentions. As Iran lost most of her technical expertise
early in the war, those weapons which were less complicated
received the greatest use, and those requiring greater
maintenance and knowledgeable service crews soon became
ineffective. Thus illegal arms trade minimally increased
the operational status of Iranian equipment and subsequently
her war-fighting capability.
The case study exposed patterns of illegal arms trade.
By exploiting this knowledge, countermeasures can be
developed and interdiction expedited. These court documents
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are an untapped intelligence source, from which an
adversary's strengths and vulnerabilities can be identified.
Through inter-agency efforts, not only could illegal arms
traffic be stifled, but information could be acquired about
an opponent's force posture.
B. INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS
Although U.S. Customs has been given the primary task of
uncovering illicit arms traffic, intelligence agencies can
aid in the detection of this illegal activity. Through the
use of these additional resources, unauthorized exports
could be curtailed without adding an unreasonable amount to
the workload already carried by over-burdened organizations.
As previously illustrated, in a majority of cases, a
third country is used as an intermediate step in the
transfer of arms in order to obscure the illegitimate trail
and facilitate the licensing procedure by providing a
"legal" but fictitious end-user. European and Far Eastern
nations have been the predominant layovers in the past.
HUMINT sources located in these countries could alert U.S.
Customs officials of impending shipments, contents,
destinations and points of embarkation. Once Customs knows
where and when to look for an illicit export, and has some
idea of what type of arms are involved, seizure and
apprehension of suspects would be expedited. Of course, the
confidentiality of the sources would be of prime importance;
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however, as in the Park case, interdiction and prosecution
can be effected without jeopardizing the source.
Intelligence resources could also be employed to
ascertain a nation's security requirements. If a restricted
country requires a weapon system or parts for which the U.S.
is the sole supplier, prior knowledge of the nation's desire
would alert law enforcement agencies to potential export
violations. For example, Iran consistently required a
specific radar tube for use on Hawk missile systems. The
American corporation Varian was the only supplier of this
component. By alerting this company to the potential of
exploitation, Customs was able to prevent this component
from being illegally exported. Additionally, when
suspicious orders or price quotation requests were solicited
from Varian, Customs was notified and often initiated
"sting" operations.
By knowing a component's shelf life and mean time
between failures (MTB), an analyst can predict a system's
vulnerabilities and requirements. Verification of
inoperable systems, either by HUMINT or national technical
means, could enhance investigative techniques. Sole
suppliers of these parts could be notified of impending
offers and export enforcement agencies alerted to watch
for those specific parts.
Recognizing an embargoed nation's needs and trade routes
is only the tip of the iceberg. Since much of the illegal
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trade consists of parts, which are not easily recognizable
items, analysts must become knowledgeable of the size, shape
and form of controlled defense munitions. It does not do
any good for a Customs agent to search a carton marked
"truck parts" if he/she does not know what the component is
supposed to look like. Additionally, the art of crateology
does not benefit an investigation if the size and shape of
suspected piece(s) is not related to the size or shape of
the container. Diagrams, incorporating dimensions, are
required when systems and/or parts suspected of being
illegally transferred.
Operational forces, through their contact with foreign
militaries can report sightings of U.S. weaponry in the
"wrong hands." Iranian gunboats were propelled by American-
made outboard motors, easily identified by U.S. Naval
personnel. Other nations illegally sell U.S. systems to
other countries. As an example, if the U.S. transferred 36
F-16s to a nation, yet only 30 reached that nation's
arsenal, foul play could be assumed. Incidents such as
these, when reported, could provide Customs with the initial
step toward detecting an unlawful operation.
Commanders must remain cognizant of their supply
inventories and requisitions. The Inanlou case, involving
over $10 million in stolen DoD parts is not an atypical
occurrence. Unusual supply expenditures, unnecessary
requisitions and missing supplies may signal illegal
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activity resulting in the export of sensitive and expensive
components.
Not only can intelligence agencies assist in the
interdiction of illegal arms but they can benefit from
examining past cases. Intelligence professionals assigned
as area specialists could monitor relevant court records to
determine trends. This information may serve to clarify the
present and forecast future events. By tracking the type of
hardware illegally shipped, intelligence personnel may be
able to discern an embargoed nation's capabilities and
vulnerabilities. Further, by analyzing a nation's desire
for specific parts, intentions may become apparent.
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Through a review of the cases and interviews with
government officials, it becomes apparent that an inter-
agency effort is required to squelch the ever-mounting black
market trade of arms. Customs, over-extended by circumvent-
ing illicit drug traffic, obstructing the increasing flow of
illegal aliens, and inspecting routine imports and exports,
needs assistance in curtailing the unlawful arms traffic.
Agencies such as the FBI, CIA, NSC, DIA (to include all
defense intelligence agencies), and local law enforcement
organizations could aid in the detection and subsequent
apprehension of transgressors.
In conjunction with routine interaction of agencies,
specific task forces, such as Operation Staunch, which
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consisted of personnel from the Departments of State,
Treasury and Commerce, should be initiated for ad hoc
investigations. These groups of investigators would be used
under exceptional circumstances, primarily when U.S. forces
are in peril from illegal arms exports obtained by an
adversary or when national security is imminently threatened
by such black market trade.
As in the DoD, a "joint service" tour for investigative
staff to a complementary agency could benefit the flow of
information and improve the utilization of assets. Gaining
knowledge of another organization's capabilities, limita-
tions and priorities through first-hand experience would
enhance information flow. Additionally, by working within
another agency professional contacts can be made which may
prove useful in future endeavors. Concurrently, if cross-
trained sufficiently, personnel could be transferred to
different agencies when workload demands.
Educating the public, particularly arms manufacturers,
brokers and shippers about illegal arms transfers may help
curtail the activity. Although competition from Third World
nations is increasing and the domestic defense budget is
declining, munitions dealers must be aware of the ramifica-
tions of illegal arms exports. An appeal to their moral
standards and elucidation of the effects on national
security might cause corporate officials to refrain from
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criminal export activity and possibly further inspire them
to aid in future investigations.
Public consciousness of the implications of illegal arms
shipments must be aroused. Too often criminal behavior is
under-valued because the shipment of controlled parts
appears to be innocuous. The seriousness of the offenses
must be continually emphasized to maintain the public's
attention. Public opinion may serve to prompt legislators
to append the current sentencing guidelines, invoking
harsher penalties.
Promoting deterrence would alleviate over-loaded
investigators, court rooms and prison systems. As
previously mentioned, educating potential violators is one
way to impede criminal activity. Another is severe
penalties for violators. To date, punishments have been
relatively trivial and fines rarely exceed the profits of
the illegal activity. Until latent violators believe the
costs outweigh the gains, illegal activity will flourish.
Criminologists suggest that swift and sure punishment is the
only deterrent, and until that has been obtained the highly
lucrative world of illegal arms traffic will continue to
thrive.
The intermediary countries must be persuaded to cease
participation in the flow of illegal arms. Extradition of
known illegal export conspirators from foreign nations is
not usually granted. The embargo of Iran was seen as an
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American political manuever by many European nations,
according to the Customs official. As such, and possibly
fearing terrorist repercussions, these countries preferred
to remain as neutral and uninvolved as possible. Pressure
from the U.S., once forces were committed in the Persian
Gulf, may have affected the European stance on the
acquiescent conduit of illicit arms to Iran, but extradition
rights have yet to be forthcoming. Additional coercion is
needed to deny safe haven to violators. However, until the
U.S. can police its own shores and stockpiles, influence may
be unconvincing.
As alluded to previously, the DoD must implement a more
effective inventory tracking system. Millions of dollars
worth of materiel has been pilfered and shipped to
adversarial nations. Storage facilities lack sufficient
security safeguards, which in itself invites criminal
operations. Surplus equipment is sold without regard to the
intentions of the buyer. During an interview with a Customs
agent, he stated that "live" missiles have been sold at
auctions. The pervasiveness of apathy within the DoD in
regards to inventory accountability versus the tight
controls seen in the commercial sector may be the result of
the lack of perceived monetary incentives. The average
government employee does not view misappropriation of state
property as a threat to his/her livelihood; although this
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lack of concern may not promote felonious behavior, the
resulting neglect facilitates criminal activity.
In summary, deterrence is seen as the most effective
method of stemming the flow of illegal arms transfers;
however, in a capitalist society, where profit is revered,
it is not realistic to assume all potential violators will
refrain from criminal behavior. Other methods must be used
when deterrence fails. Inter-agency surveillance and
detection should be promoted; educating corporations and the
general public of the ramifications of illicit arms exports
should be provided; profit motives must be diminished and
punishments expanded to prevent the further escalation of
illegal arms traffic.
D. FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
Other factors which affect illegal arms transfers were
beyond the scope of this study, yet demand further
investigation. As the Third World nations develop their
weapon manufacturing expertise and sophistication, this will
have a serious impact on the U.S. policy of arms sales as a
foreign policy tool. As the U.S. is a sole supplier to many
nations, an embargo such as Iran's can be an effective
diplomatic device. Lesser-developed nations have already
seen the usefulness of manufacturing "bootleg" parts,
duplications of American components. Not only does this
phenomenon impugn political motives for arms restrictions,
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it also seriously frustrates adequate threat analyses with
the possibility of clandestinely supplied materiel.
Another consideration is the question of interdiction
versus countermeasures and which is the most beneficial and
cost effective of these options. If interdiction proves to
be too expensive or ineffective, perhaps it would be more
economic simply to maintain a force structure impervious to
the ill-gotten hardware.
Lastly, with a limited amount of resources available,
should interdiction efforts be focused upon illicit high- or
low-technology weapons? High technology weapons may be more
accurate, devastating and insidious, yet less sophisticated
weaponry is normally easier to maintain, obtain and
reproduce. It would be an interesting digression to compare
the damaqe caused in recent decades by both categories of
weapons to see which had the greater effect.
If given enough time, money and investigative latitude,
the conclusions drawn in this thesis would be supplemented,
strengthened, or proven inaccurate. Additional inquiries
should focus on three main areas: U.S. governmental,
defense and court officials; intermediary country officials;
and Iranian governmental and defense officials. The
extended probe would primarily employ interviews; however,
this data would be appended and substantiated by exhaustive
study of court documents, the review of tomes of evidence
acquired by investigative agencies, and historical fact.
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The place to begin this study would be at the source, the
individuals perpetrating the crime and those trying to stop
it.
Dialogues with the criminals would provide information
not obtained in court documents or evidence. Data as to why
they engaged in this type of activity may serve to curtail
and/or identify future violators. It has already been
surmised that greed played a major role in the recruitment
of illegal exporters, but how much money does it take to
persuade someone to break the law, possibly face prison and
on a moral plane, turn against one's country? Other infor-
mation which was unknown to investigators and prosecutors at
the time of trial may also come to light during these
conversations. In many cases the offender may want his/her
lawyer present during the interviews to ensure nothing is
said which may incriminate the individual in additional
crimes. In this instance, and possibly in all other cases,
the defense attorney should be examined.
Counselors for both defense and prosecution could
reflect on their attitudes concerning the modifications of
trial strategy as a result of the Iran-Contra affair.
Prosecutors are wary of cases in which a suspect's knowledge
of acting independent of government involvement in the
illegal export of arms is not confirmed. Additionally, the
defense attorney may use his client's perception of
government involvement as rationalization for the crime. In
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either case, it is up to the investigative agency (Customs,
FBI, CIA, Commerce, State, or DIS, to include all DoD inves-
tigative agencies) to employ techniques to foil any possible
defense maneuvers. Thus an interview with the agencies
involved in apprehending violators would be prudent.
Conversations with local agents would contribute
additional information on specific cases. In concert, it
mdy prove beneficial to the study to gain first-hand
knowledge of collection techniques. Although this is a
sensitive area, various ways have been depicted in court
records and if desired, anonymity and non-disclosure of
procedures would prevail; however, this experience may prove
helpful in further research.
Other sources of data would be the district court judges
pertaining to sentencing patterns and legislators concerning
sentencing limitations. Additionally, DoD officials
involved with logistics and control could furnish requisite
data on any new measures incorporated to oversee the massive
defense supply system, to ensure that infiltration, as in
the Inanlou case, is prevented.
The second phase of this extended research model
concerns the intermediary countries, primarily Great
Britain, Switzerland, West Germany, Italy, France, and
Singapore. Again interview would be the basic tool of the
inquiry. It would be interesting to note the foreign
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philosophy and opinions of being used as a conduit for the
illegal export and sale of U.S. munitions.
Finally, conversations with Iranian government and
military officials could substantiate the extent and effect
of illegal arms exports during the war with Iraq. At
present it seems unlikely that such interviews could
transpire, yet expatriates may provide valuable data and in
time, further details of the war will emerge.
Thus, to complete the expose of the illegal arms trade
to Iran during the conflict with Iraq, vast resources, time,
and data which are currently unavailable are needed. This
thesis serves as an initial step on which future study can
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INTERVIEW WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
30 JANUARY @ 0800
1. Did intelligence tasking increase with the movement of
U.S. warships into the Persian Gulf?
*Yes, interest did increase upon the U.S. presence in
those waters, but the tasking remained about the same.
Sometimes we got twice the normal amount of coverage, but
that emphasis increased and waned periodically over the
years of the Iran-Iraq war.
2. Are SIPRI and Jane's Defense Weekly accurate concerning
military capabilities?
*They are generally correct except when the numbers
relate to Soviet-sponsored, Nicaraguan-sponsored, or Iranian
arms deals. Iran seeks very low visibility and no publicity
regarding arms shipments due to the U.S.-led embargo
attempts.
3. How do we get our intelligence data concerning Iran's
military capabilities?
*We monitor shipments through Lloyd's of London
publications and through sightings from friendly port/ship
personnel. We get info from human sources. These include
refugees, deserters, as well as any in-place personnel that
may exist. Other sources are classified.
4. Are the Iranians able to effectively maintain their most
complicated equipment and repair/replace spare parts on
this equipment?
*Yes. They wouldn't go to so much trouble to obtain
parts that they couldn't effectively utilize. They are
obviously able to at least sometimes effectively maintain
complicated U.S. equipment. However, they may be obtaining
some maintenance assistance from the Israelis.
5. Are there are Americans in Iran assisting with military
equipment maintenance?
*No. I don't think there were any Americans left in
Iran after the hostages were released.
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INTERVIEW WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
30 JANUARY 1989 @ 1330
1. Did Operation Staunch intensify any with the deployment
of U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf?
*There were no changes in the areas of intelligence
gathering or reporting. Operation Staunch proceeded as it
previously had, with the exception that our diplomats could
now show increased interest and reasons for other nations to
stop arms shipments to Iran since American lives were at
peril. The JCS were most concerned that U.S. lives were in
danger and policy setters were concerned when U.S. ships
entered the Persian Gulf. This last concern seemed to be
political in nature with the threat of public disfavor if
American lives were lost in combat. When the Chinese
silkworm missiles were discovered in Iran, considerable
pressure was applied to the Chinese until they agreed not to
provide Iran with additional missiles.
2. Did Iran need U.S. spare parts?
*No they didn't. The Shah bought enormous quantities of
spare parts filling up countless warehouses. There are
still warehouses full of spare parts bought under the Shah's
reign that have been overlooked/misplaced.
3. What effect did the U.S. embargo have upon Iran's need
for parts?
*We really don't know the effect of the embargo, because
of the countless supplies of spare parts bought under the
Shah's reign. The Iranians are constantly finding
warehouses filled with spare parts needed for American
equipment. When the Iranians couldn't locate enough ware-
houses containing U.S. parts, they attempted to purchase the
parts. When this became impossible, they were most willing
to try to purchase the parts illegally so as to prevent
publicity of their need for parts.
4. What effect did the illegal transfer of U.S. parts to
Iran have on their military capability?
*While this is a question unable to be measured precise-
ly, the small transfer of illegally shipped parts didn't
seem to make any difference in Iran's military capability.
There really didn't appear to be a large quantity of parts
that actually reached Iran, and many of the ones that did
were beyond their shelf life or were defective.
5. When did Operation Staunch begin, how effective was it,
and what specific information can you provide on the
topic?
*Operation Staunch began in about 1983. It was a
marginally effective program until Irangate hit, and then
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worldwide attention was brought to governments' unpublicized
selling of arms to Iran. With Irangate, just about all of
the Western governments joined the bandwagon to stop arms
shipments to Iran. At the least, this attention drove the
prices of arms up for Iran, drove the purchasing networks
underground, and disrupted some of the shipment logistics.
It is generally felt that Operation Staunch reduced Iran's
ability to conduct large scale warfare. She couldn't mount
large offenses on the scale of the war's early years.
Staunch had an effect on Iran's inability to match Iraq's
strength. This helped Iran to be forced to accept a cease
fire agreement.
*It would be helpful to look at the situation existing
if Staunch had not been implemented. The Iranians had
enormous reserves of cash (oil income of about $10 billion
per year in the early years of the war) and would have had
the opportunity to buy arms/parts from all of the European
sources. Free access to private markets would have provided
them the opportunity to spend well over their normal $2.5
billion per year on arms. Because of the American embargo
and the effects of Operation Staunch, Iran had to turn to
China and North Korea for supplies which turned out to be
less capable equipment. The loss of Western markets was
replaced almost on a one-to-one basis by sales from China/
N. Korea. It appears that China sold Iran some surplus
tanks, the Silkworm missiles, and quantities of ammunition.
There is speculation over sales of fighter aircraft, but
none have ever been known to have been received in Iran.
North Korea sold Iran small arms, mortars, and quantities of
ammunition.
*In spite of Iran's need for additional aircraft, there
is no evidence that anyone actually delivered a single air-
craft to Iran, other than possibly a few trainers. This was
due to the bad publicity from the hostage crisis during the
early part of the war, and due to Operation Staunch during
the later years. The European sales amounted to very little
money annually and did not include any major items.
6. What were the Iranian perceptions of their military
capability needs?
*At the beginning of the war, they felt that they had
more than enough aircraft, armor, artillery, ammunition,
etc. This changed in 1981/82 when Iran entered Iraq and the
border warfare became a fact of life. For the first time
since routing the Iraqi's, the Iranians were stopped cold at
the Iraq border. Iraq hadn't performed well at all militar-
ily. They didn't achieve their objectives quickly, if at
all. But the Iranian military became worse and worse with
the rise of the Revolutionary guard. This group was not
militarily effective or well-trained, but rather was
politically fervent. Promotions were based upon adherence
to religious beliefs, and not military achievements/skill.
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*When military equipment/parts were received in Iran and
distributed by these fanatical and disorganized Revolution-
ary Guards, it was not immediately sent to locations
requiring its use, nor to warehouses where it could be
retrieved when needed. Much received equipment was put on
display or held in Teheran. If Iran would have been allowed
to purchase arms openly and freely, more of the received
arms would have been sent to regular army units and would
have been used effectively, unlike its use by the
Revolutionary Guards.
*As the war dragged on, the Iranians became aware of a
need for more trained pilots. There was a large-scale
defection of F-4/F-14 pilots following the revolution which
eventually led to a downing of some planes due to a lack of
pilots. Immediately following the revolution, there was a
wide-scale slaughter of Western-trained personnel and a
general harsh treatment for those who survived. Pilots
trained in the U.S. were out of favor. However, some did
survive and attempted to train Iranian flight students in
the skills required to pilot F-4/14 aircraft. These pilots
were not very effective.
7. What, if anything, caused a scopping of arms/parts
shipments to Iran?
*The U.S. hostage crisis, Irangate, and U.S. ships in
the Persian Gulf all led to the stopping of parts sold to
Iran. Immediately following Irangate, there were seven or
eight scandals in foreign nations which resulted in a big
drop off of sales afterward. Psychological warfare was
effectively used worldwide after the hostage crisis, when
the U.S. said it was "anathema" to sell arms to those
"bastard fanatics" who so readily violate international law
and courtesies by imprisoning diplomatic personnel.
8. Did any Iranian equipment become in an "up" status due
to illegally transferred U.S. parts?
*No, other than four P-3's coming into an up status,
everything else continued to get worse and worse. The
existing equipment was either damaged in battle, or broke
due to use without available spare parts. As cannibaliza-
tion took place, some equipment was retained in an opera-
tional status, but this number kept on dwindling too.
9. How important were the Hawk Missile System replacement
parts to Iranian capability?
*This system never really figured very highly in the
Iranian defense philosophy. They depended upon F-4/5 air-
craft for air defense, much like the U.S. itself.
10. Did the Iranians have the technical expertise to repair
their complicated equipment?
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*Yes they did. The fact is that many of the Western-
trained technicians were executed or fled following the
first months of the revolution, but enough remained that
maintenance could be performed on the most complicated of
systems. F-14 aircraft and Hawk missile system equipment
were able to be maintained at least some of the time. While
there were not sufficient numbers of properly trained tech-
nicians to service all of the existing equipment, there were
some available that could maintain some of the equipment.
And these technicians attempted to train the smartest
available students in their skills. The Iranians considered
Americans as the "Great Satan" and did not want Americans in
their country even if they possessed the skills to effec-
tively maintain and repair Iran's most complicated
equipment.
11. What equipment did Iran want to buy?
*Iran distributed a 39-page "shopping list" at the start
of the war from their purchasing agents stationed in London.
This list remained about the same throughout the war, with
only changes requested in delivery times (especially for
ammunition deliveries as offensives were planned or as
supplies were running critically low). The list did not
change in any relation to upcoming offensives nor special
losses in battle. It mostly contained requests for truck/
tank/aircraft parts. Requests for missiles, F-14 parts, and
Varian tubes for the Hawk missile system were often directed
in person to arms dealers or the companies manufacturing
needed parts.
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INTERVIEW WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
30 JANUARY 1989 @ 1500
1. When did the U.S. place Iran on an "Embargo List?"
*This "embargo" is called the "Munitions Control List"
and Iran has been on this list since about the time of their
revolution--approximately February of 1979. By being
included on this list, Iran was prevented from legally
acquiring U.S. manufactured war goods.
2. Was there more than one "embargo" placed upon Iran by
the United States?
*There were two other findings against Iran that
resulted in "tightenings" of the items allowable to be
transferred to that country. First, in 1984, the Secretary
of State formally found that Iran supported world terrorism
so an additional list of items became forbidden for sale to
Iran. This included the "dual use" items such as all
aircraft, all aircraft spare parts and components, national
security commodities, technical data, naval and marine
equipment, communications equipment, electronic test equip-
ment, cryptographic equipment, off-highway wheel tractors,
large diesel engines, portable electric generators, and
chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.
Secondly, in 1987 the restriction list was tightened
further to include high-speed power boats and scuba gear,
which had been identified as having military applications.
These "embargoes" were imposed by the Secretary of State but
were administered by the Department of Commerce through the
Office of Export Licensing.
3. Do you feel that much militarily useful U.S. material
was received by Iran in spite of the embargo?
*I believe that the "black market" arms sales were the
key to Iran's ability to keep airplanes in the air during
their recent war. When the war started, Iran didn't have
sufficient spare parts to maintain their aircraft, and this
shortage grew more acute as the war continued. We don't
know how many aircraft were kept in, or placed into, an "up"
status due to illegally transferred parts, due to the hidden
and secretive nature of these shipments. We also have great
uncertainties concerning exactly how many Iranian aircraft
were in an "up" status. But because the U.S. is the only
country manufacturing F-14 spare parts, and since we had an
embargo against transferring these parts to Iran, and since
there were always operational F-14 aircraft in the Iranian
inventory, they must have been receiving spare parts from
the U.S. via illegal means.
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30 JANUARY 1989 @ 1545
1. What was Operation Staunch's original rationale?
*"By denying Iran's warfighting capability, we would
drive them to the bargaining table and thus end the war."
And to this stated end, Operation Staunch seems to have been
effective.
2. What were some of the effects of Operation Staunch?
*Every year saw a drop in the total arms sales to Iran
from Western European and non-Communist Bloc countries after
Irangate. These countries may have not been responding
directly to pressure from Staunch, but possibly were acting
in their own self interests as they didn't want to see Iran
become dominant in that region of the world. They may have
feared the results to their economies and political
influence if Iran won the war and gained influence.
3. Can you give me specific monetary figures of the drop in
arms sales due to Operation Staunch?
*For a ball park figure, by the summer/fall of 1986,
sales from Western European and non-bloc countries dropped
by 80%. But this was made up for, on a one-to-one basis, by
the PRC and North Korea.
The following figures concern arms sales to Iran from
West/West European sources:
- In 1984 there were $1+ billion spent on arms sales.
- In 1988 these sales were down to $200 million.
4. Can you give specifics on military systems or types of
weapons that were eliminated from Iran's operational
inventory due to Operation Staunch?
*We convinced the Chinese not to ship Silkworm missiles
to Iran. We completely ended Iranian mini-submarine
purchases from Germany/Italy. We ended the functioning of
certain classes of patrol boats due to the lack of replace-
ment parts. And due to a close working relationship with
U.S. Customs, we were able to prevent A _ Varian Tubes from
entering Iran.
5. Do you really believe that Do Varian Tubes entered Iran,
and how do you know this?
*We don't believe that a single Varian tube entered
Iran, because these tubes are only manufactured at one
company, and this company has cooperated with Customs from
the beginning of the embargo to notify them of all requests
for this item. Several "sting" operations have been set up
to capture the hopeful shippers of these tubes to Iran.
Upon occasion real Varian tubes that were disabled or simply
worn out were freshly painted to give the appearance of new
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equipment, and were shown to buyers attempting to ship this
controlled item back to Iran. But to our knowledge, there
have been no live Varian tubes shipped to Iran.
6. Were replacement parts for the Hawk Missile System
transferred to Iran?
*It appears that the main shipment of parts for this
system were provided to Iran by Israel. Israel sold Iran
these missile system parts, plus other high-priority/high-
tech parts, in order to protect itself from Iraq. Of course
Israel felt more threat from Iraq than from Iran. Israel is
suspected of selling Iran radar parts for their SAM's, anti-
tank missiles, communications gear, and F-4/5 jet parts.
But even with these Israeli parts, Iran was not able to
do more than replace their attrition. By the winter of
1987, Iran possessed far less war materials than when she
entered the war in September 1980.
7. What was the effect of Irangate on Operation Staunch?
*It focused world attention on the "secret" governmental
sales of arms to Iran by other world governments. This
caused seven or eight scandals as previously hidden arms
sales were revealed. Other countries began halting sales to
Iran, the intended purpose of Staunch, and the U.S. embar-
rassment actually helped achieve our intended purpose.
8. What is your understanding of the military items that
were actually received by Iran, and their value, through
the Irangate operations?
*The total value of the arms is estimated at approxi-
mately $18-20 million. Although difficult to accurately
determine, it is believed that approximately 1600 TOW
missiles and a quantity of I-Hawk missiles were actually
received by Iran.
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31 JANUARY 1989 @0900
1. What exactly is your area of responsibility here?
*The State Department determines which arms sales are in
the best interests of the overall world stability. I am
responsible for the foreign policy portion of the sale/
resale of significant military equipment. I have to deter-
mine if the U.S. agrees to allow a country possessing U.S.-
made military equipment, or equipment containing U.S.-made
parts, to be resold to another nation. In this capacity I
work for the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico
Military Affairs--Ambassador Helms.
2. Do you believe that very much illegally transferred
military equipment/parts were received by Iran during
their war with Iraq?
*There exists a real capability for U.S. citizens to
illegally transfer U.S. origin weapons to restricted coun-
tries. There is biQ money to be made in arms sales. The
U.S. gives foreign aid in the form of military arms sales
especially to Israel and Egypt. We do this allegedly
because of the good that it provides for the recipient
country, but in reality we do this for the good will and
privileges derived for the U.S. from our aid. When we sell
hardware to other countries, we train their people to use
and maintain the equipment in U.S. locations/facilities so
these people can get the idea of how good life is in the
United States, and we make a "friend."
While we supply vast sums of money and equipment to
Israel and Egypt, we cannot afford to adequately provide for
all the other potentially friendly nations that request
arms. Israel takes some of the arms that the U.S. has
provided them and sells them to these other requesting
countries. Israel did sell some spare parts to Iran, though
these were probably limited to F-4 parts.
3. Are there any kinds of materials that your office
approves for transfer to Iran?
*We allow the sale of personal protection equipment for
the heads of state. We do scrutinize the requests to ensure
that the number in kind of requested items are appropriate
for their described purpose. We are talking about armored
limousines and related equipment to protect the heads of
state. We feel that as bad as some leaders may be, at least
we somewhat understand their motivations and probable
actions. They are a "known quantity" to us, whereas their
successors would be "mystery men" and possibly far worse.
We preferred to sell protective equipment for Khomeini
rather than face the possibility of a more fanatical leader
replacing him in the event of an assassination.
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We sold Iran cardio-pulmonary and cardio-vascular equip-
ment, although even this was carefully scrutinized.
4. Do you feel that much U.S. military equipment was
received by Iran during their recent war?
*No I don't. Iran needed large quantities of cheap,
easily replaceable equipment, and the U.S. doesn't supply
that sort of item. The more technical, expensive, and more
easily controlled items that the U.S. manufactures and sells
were just too difficult to consistently and effectively get-
out of the country and into Iran. Also, you've got to
remember that Iran depended more upon bullets and artillery/
mortar rounds backed by advancing masses of soldiers than
upon Hawk missile systems of F-14's or other technical and
mechanically "delicate" equipment.
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31 JANUARY 1989 @1030
1. Was Operation Staunch effective in preventing sufficient
military arms from reaching Iran?
*For many nations the export of military goods is a main
source of income. For the U.S. the sales of arms amounts to
a yearly income of between $12-20 billion. For some smaller
nations, the economics of small forces requires selling of
military arms to other buyers to make their manufacturing
profitable. As to Operation Staunch's effectiveness, that
is a hard question to answer. We found it impossible to
shut down Iran's receipt of equipment, munitions, grenades,
etc. But we significantly raised the costs of importing
this equipment into Iran. We had a substantial contribution
to slowing the supply of equipment into Iran. Without the
U.S.'s efforts, China would still be selling billions of
dollars of arms to Iran. In fact, the stopping of Chinese
arms sales to Iran was the second most important reason that
compelled Iran to accept a cease fire agreement. The most
important reason was the internal turmoil caused by the mass
slaughter of young boys during the war.
2. What did Iran attempt to acquire during the war?
*Iran had a supply bottleneck largely due to the U.S.
embargo that was imposed about the time of the Embassy
hostage crisis. This was an evidence of their control by a
supplier nation. They needed everything to keep their air-
craft flying. They also wanted standoff weapons to attack
shipping--Silkworm missiles. They also wanted missiles for
the purpose of attacking Iraqi cities. Iraqi supplies were
sufficient for their need, unlike Iran's severe limitation
of received supplies.
At first Iran fought with the weapons left in their
arsenals from the Shah's U.S. purchases. But these sophis-
ticated weapons gradually broke, or were war losses, and the
Iranians' use of weapons degraded down to small arms fire,
and sometimes just human wave assaults with boys that didn't
carry weapons. Once they got down to this level of
fighting, it was hard to improve their lot. So the "grey
market" became great for supplying Iran with small arms and
ammunition. Not so much the U.S., but other countries sent
this type of arms to Iran quasi-legally and covertly. Often
Greek shipping carried the goods to Iranian ports. They
were able to acq'.ire SCUDs for use against Iraqi cities.
The Iranians were pretty much able to acquire what they
needed for the war. But these needs were mostly for small
arms, ammunition, and artillery rounds. Towards the end of
the war, Iran was having difficulty in paying for the
received war materials.
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3. What was Israel's part in supplying Iran?
*Israel had a long-time relationship with the Shah's
intelligence command. They did supply some materials to
Iran. But after all, you are a friend of your enemy's
enemy.
104
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31 JANUARY 1989 @1430
1. When did the U.S. first impose an embargo against Iran?
*We suspended all licenses and approvals for export to
Iran of defense articles on November 28, 1979.
2. What Acts govern the export of items to foreign
countries?
*Section 38 of the Export Administration Act governs the
vast amount of commodities exported from the U.S. by non-
governmental entities.
The Arms Export Control Act governs export from the U.S.
by both U.S. governmental and non-governmental entities of
defense articles and furnishings of defense services (train-
ing, maintenance, assistance in assembling).
The Defense Security Assistance Agency governs govern-
mental entities in the export of items.
3. What effect do these Acts have on promoting U.S.
national security?
*"The U.S. controls exports for the furtherance of world
peace, foreign policy, and security interests."
4. So after November 28, 1979, were all transfer of U.S.
war materials to Iran attempted without the request
for/use of a proper license?
*Yes. Anyone attempting to engage in an arms transac-
tion out of our country into Iran required a license to do
so. And no licenses were granted for such purposes after
November 28, 1979. Therefore, anyone attempting such trans-
actions without a license broke the law. Actually, anyone
even conspiring to illegally ship arms without a license was
guilty of breaking the law, without even shipping any arms.
This was the situation in the Zamani and Kangarloo cases of
attempted arms transfer.
In the Zamani case, Mr. Zamani did not actually ship any
arms or parts to Iran, not that he didn't try to do so. For
various reasons, his parts deal fell through before he could
complete all transactions and ship the goods to Iran, but he
was recorded on tape as possessing knowledge that he was
required to have a license to export his parts, and that he
was not going to request a licence--because he knew that all
such requests were being denied.
*The sentences for violating this law can be up to a $1
million fine and ten years imprisonment. This new, harsher
sentencing became available in 1986.
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5. Why do you think people tried to transport parts to
Iran? Was it a patriotic action of Iranian nationals?
Are there any common characteristics of the people
attempting these illegal arms/parts transfers?
*With almost a 100% accuracy, all illegal transfer
attempts were accomplished by entrepreneurs interested in
the lucrative profit potential. These people involved in
the illegal arms transfers were not the most moral nor the
highest class of individual. They saw the potential for
profit and they pursued it regardless of the illegality of
their actions. They didn't expect to be caught, but the
profits were so high that they risked the danger of
detection. Possibly some of these people were former
Iranian citizens and felt loyalty towards their homeland,
but it seems to me that their main overriding concern was
the potential profit from these arms sales. There were
criminals!
6. How much materials do you think actually reached Iran
through illegal arms transfers?
*The number of F-4's flying indicated that some parts
got to Iran. F-4 parts are manufactured in many locations
and possibly some foreign vendors sold these to Iran. Also,
there is a real problem with falsified end-user statements
being utilized which falsifies the actual recipient of the
exported parts. If an exporter states that Israel is the
final destination for F-4 parts, but actually ships them
from Israel to Iran, the U.S. export controls have been
sidestepped.
There was a time when unclassified parts could be copied
from technical data packages at holding facilities. Then
these drawings could be used as a source for making the
actual parts. Therefore, there are probably many, many
sources for some F-4 parts, and a potential illegal exporter
could easily get some parts manufactured, and then either
falsify the contents of his shipment (list the F-4 parts as
"washing machine" parts) or utilize a false end-user
statement.
In my best estimation, there were:
- No Hawk missile parts received in Iran (other than
some I-Hawk missiles through Irangate).
- No F-14 parts received in Iran.
- Some F-4 parts were received in Iran.
- Some tank tracks were received in Iran.
- Much ammunition and small arms were received, though
mostly through non-U.S. sources.
7. Did many arms merchants try to get licenses after the
embargo?
*Yes, quite a few did, but after being turned down once
most didn't try again. And there were many that just didn't
106
attempt to get a license at all after the embargo was
imposed.
8. Did Iran have the technical expertise in place to
perform maintenance on the sophisticated U.S. equipment,
and to correctly replace failed parts?
*Iran probably had a few people capable of properly
repairing the sophisticated U.S. equipment. Yes, I feel
certain that they had the expertise in place to repair and
maintain U.S. equipment. But they didn't have enough of
these trained people. Of course, that didn't matter a lot,
because the Iranians didn't have the parts needed to repair
the U.S. equipment. They had the expertise to repair the
equipment if they would have had the parts, but they didn't
have the parts.
Let me be more specific. I believe that the Iranians
actually had a good supply of parts on hand. They just
didn't know where they were located. Immediately after the
revolution, the fanatics began killing a number of foreign-
trained technicians/inventory control/computer operator
personnel, which resulted in the loss of most of Iran's
logistical structure. The people who knew where the vast
quantities of parts were located, and those who knew how to
find that information which was stored on computers, were
massacred. Others fled the country after seeing the fates
of their fellow workers. Many of these erased computer
records of warehouse locations and parts accounting soft-
ware. So on November 28, 1979, the U.S. shut off all supply
of U.S. parts to Iran, and the Iranians complicated their
situation by executing a lot of middle and high-level
management personnel involved with the parts supply and
storage business.
Even if Iran had needed parts located in forgotten
warehouses around the country, by being unable to
consistently locate them, they had a devastating parts
crisis. I believe that Iran's radars went down in 1982 and
no replacement parts reached them from the U.S. Not one
functional Varian tube reached Iran, and so their Hawk
missile system was not used to try and preserve the life of
their existing Varian tubes.
8. Were these illegal arms/parts transfers a National
Security concern?
*No. There were no Hawk missile batteries up due to
failed illuminators. So these would not have been a threat
to overflying U.S. warplanes. And Iran had so few F-14's
operational (about 8-10) that she surely wouldn't have
pitted them against an American air strike possessing
upwards of 12 F-14's.
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9. Then how could these illegal transfers have hurt the
American National Security?
*If Iran would have received the needed parts to get
their search and surveillance radars up, those needed to get
their missile systems connected to their detection systems,
and if they could have gotten more F-14's up, then our
National Security would have been endangered by the threat
to all of our forces in the Persian Gulf and those that
might attempt to overfly Iranian soil.
10. Was there any pattern to the items illegally transfer-
red? Did requests indicate upcoming offensive war
needs?
*No. There was no pattern to requested items. The list
of requested parts remained essentially the same for the
duration of the war.
11. Should the U.S. Parts Supply System be overhauled or
better regulated?
*No. Our system is based upon our economic system which
allows many vendors to bid for projects. While a single
source vendor simplifies efforts to prevent illegal export
of manufactured items, simple economics causes multiple
vendors to be allowed to bid for manufacturing rights for
parts after the system is no longer being produced by the
parent company.
12. Do you feel that illegal arms/parts transfer attempts to
Iran began with the Iran-Iraq War or were these
happening previously?
*They were not unique to the war. I cannot say exactly
or quote specific illegal shipment attempts, but Iran did
attempt to illegally transfer U.S. non-approved items before
their war with Iraq. Even when the Shah was a great
American ally, we did not share everythinq with him. So
there were always attempts to acquire what we did not want
to be exported.
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1. Did the Iranians attempt to illegally transfer U.S.
arms/parts into their country? Why? How?
*The Iranians were unable to legally buy U.S. spare
parts and other arms so they tried to acquire them the only
way available to them. The Iranians "published" a list of
the war materials they needed and were willing to purchase
from any supplier. They most often were not the actual
person/s who directly violated U.S. export laws--they did
not falsify the contents of shipments nor the actual end-
user--although they may have advised their purchasing
contacts to do so. The Iranians could not manufacture
components for sophisticated U.S. arms systems, and there
were no merchants other than the U.S. for F-14 and Hawk
missile parts that they could buy materials from, so they
were forced to illegally acquire their U.S. parts if they
hoped to possess any of these items.
At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had lots of
available currency with which to purchase arms around the
globe. They placed several "procurers" in London to
distribute their "war materials shopping list" and to
coordinate purchases from any interested arms/parts
merchants. These procurers would either simply receive
calls from interested buyers and then make deals, or they
would directly contact known arms merchants/arms manufac-
turers. In this way most of their arms purchases were
conducted.
2. Did the Iranians make any special attempts to recruit
buyers/shippers of illegal arms transactions?
*No. There seemed to always be an unending supply of
greedy businessmen desiring the substantial profits avail-
able from this type of trade. However, while this might not
be termed "recruitment," Iranian agents did directly contact
some U.S. arms manufacturers/parts manufacturers in attempts
to purchase needed parts.
3. What parts did the Iranians most often attempt to
illegally ship to their country?
*They needed and attempted to obtain F-14 parts, Hawk
missile system components/missiles, tank parts, and most
recently components for producing chemical gasses.
4. How did the U.S. discover the attempted illegal
shipments?
*There were several means of discovery including:
- Undercover Operations where companies manufacturing
war materials/components notify U.S. Customs
whenever unauthorized requests for materials occur.
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Then U.S. Customs sets up "sting" operations to
capture the felons.
- Information from freight forwarders leads Customs to
apprehend felons.
- All of the various types of "whistle-blowers" that
recognize an attempt to illegally ship controlled
goods and contact Customs.
- Jilted girlfriends of the smugglers.
- News reel footage revealed the Iranian use of U.S.
manufactured speed boats for military purposes,
which prompted the U.S. to restrict sales of those
"dual use" items also.
5. How successful do you feel the U.S. was at catching the
"bad guys?"
*I think we were very successful, but you never really
know the extent of the illegal involvement. You never know
what you don't know. I mean that we cannot give a good
estimation of the extent of undetected illegal shipments
because we were either unable to detect them, or else there
were not any besides the ones we detected.
6. Are there any remedies to our system of arms/parts sales
that would make it more difficult for illegal arms
shipments to occur?
*We should watch the sales of our surplus goods. When
the government sells its surplus goods to private distribu-
tors, they are depending on them to behave legally and not
sell to terrorist groups or countries opposed to the U.S.
Perhaps the government should conduct all sales of these
surplus goods itself to ensure that they go to legal
sources, instead of depending upon the honesty of a private
distributor.
The FBI conducts a program designed to sensitize defense
contractors toward illegal attempts to acquire militarily-
oriented materials and national security needs from them--
called the DECA Program.
7. If we are very successful at halting illegal arms/parts
shipments, how expensive is this interdiction process?
Is there a better/cheaper manner in which to accomplish
the same results?
*I believe that we are very successful in detecting,
capturing, and convicting illegal arms smugglers. The
interdiction process is v expensive, but we have an
arrangement with the military where we "borrow" their opera-
tional equipment/parts to show to prospective buyers in a
sting operation, and then return the equipment to the mili-
tary. This substantially reduces the costs of our sting
operations. So interdiction is expensive, but fr less
expensive than it could be. And interdiction expenses are
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far less than the potential costs of an operational Hawk
missile system or F-14.
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1. How did the Iranians go about getting their needed
supplies shipped illegally from the U.S.
*A branch of the Iranian Embassy in London was used as a
quasi "contracting office" for bids for desired military
equipment/parts. The Iranians had a complete technical
library for the F-14 aircraft so they knew exactly what to:
ask for, and the stock numbers. If they required 20 Varian
tubes, they put out the word of their need for these parts,
and maybe 20 different arms brokers would telephone the
Varian Corporation and request to buy 20 Varian tubes. so
to the Varian Corporation, it would appear that the Iranian
need was for 400 Varian tubes when they actually only needed
20.
2. How did the illegal shippers go about requesting their
needed parts/equipment--did they call the manufacturers
and ask for specific parts?
*More often than not the purchasers would telephone a
manufacturer with a list of the needed part numbers. This
was very professionally done.
3. Do you believe that a large quantity of illegally
shipped parts/equipment reached Iran?
*No, I don't. I don't think enough parts reached Iran
to keep any of their systems operationally "up," nor to
bring any "downed" gear back into an "up" status.
4. Did there seem to be a pattern between the requested
parts/equipment and Iran's current/future combat
requirements?
*No, there didn't seem to be this correlation. The list
of needed parts remained about the same for the duration of
the war. About the only thing changing was the speed of
delivery that Iran wanted--they often requested expedited
delivery of small arms ammunition and artillery rounds.
Possibly through consolidating each of the indicted cases
you could determine some trend that escapes us now. But we
don't really look at that perspective of the illegal trans-
fer attempts--rather our intelligence analysts look at
broader security issues like preventing the opportunity for
critical arms components to illegally leave our country.
5. So you don't think that what Iran attempted to illegally
transfer was a function of their war plans?
*No I don't. Iran always needed Hawk missile parts and
Varian tubes and F-14 parts because the ones they had were
beyond their shelf life or had broken or were war
casualties. So while Iran kept these items on her "want
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list" she didn't actually receive them. And what she really
needed and used were the massive shipments of small arms
ammunition and artillery rounds. These items were not used
in some "special" offensive, but rather were used in every
battle.
6. Do you think that Customs cases/indictments could be
used as an intelligence tool by the military to discover
critical military equipment/parts requirements?
*Rather it seems that Customs can use military/govern-
mental intelligence reports to determine what parts the
Iranians need in order for our agents to effectively
discover their attempts to illegally ship these materials.
As an example, through Project Gemini, U.S. Customs
identifies the makers of defense parts, the freight
forwarders, the exporters, and everyone else possibly
involved in the shipment of arms, and asks for their
cooperation in calling in reports of requests for specific
illegal arms. This has been exceedingly valuable with the
Varian Corporation out of Palo Alto, California--the only
makers of the Varian tubes that are a critical component in
the Hawk missile system. These tubes are required for the
TPSA ground-based radar which initially detects incoming
aircraft, and for the fire control radar on the Hawk missile
system itself. Well, all of the Iranian Varian tubes are
well past their shelf life, and Iran can only get these
tubes from the Varian Corporation in Palo Alto. So Customs
has an arrangement with Varian Corporation for them to
notify Customs every time an "unusual" or suspicious request
for Varian tubes is made. Through their cooperation, not
one Varian tube has been received in Iran. The company can
account for every one of their Varian tubes.
7. What is the difference between Operation Exodus and
Operation Staunch?
*Operation Exodus is a Customs initiative to stop
strategic exports (technical or munitions) from going to any
illegal destination.
Operation Staunch is a State Department initiative to
stop munitions from going to Iran.
8. Were illegal arms sales/shipments to Iran a new
phenomenon starting with the Iran-Iraq War?
*No, they were going on for years before. You must
remember that even our allies aren't allowed to receive all
of our military munitions. And so even when the Shah was
our friend, I think that there were attempts to ship non-
authorized equipment to Iran. But this is hard to prove
without looking over every indictment for the past umpteen
years.
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1. Was the illegal shipment of parts to Iran a new
phenomenon beginning with the Iran-Iraq War?
*No, it wasn't a new phenomenon. Illegal arms shipments
were occurring even when the Shah was in place. Parts
requiring licenses might have been illegally shipped. I say
might because I don't have any evidence immediately at my
disposal, but I'm sure this was taking place even when Iran
was our close friend. And the reason I don't have examples
is because illegal shipments to Iran, and others of our
allies, weren't being studied back then when they were
occurring.
2. Is there something deficient with the U.S. parts system
that lends itself to fraud?
*The potential for misuse of arms and for fraud is
great. Israel is selling some of the military aid that we
send them. President Marcos of the Philippines was selling
U.S. arms to other countries for personal gain.
3. How can the system be better regulated?
*Possibly more prosecutions/convictions would lower the
amount of crime. More publicity of successful convictions
might lower the incentive to illegally export--this might
create a better deterrent.
People don't often know what to do when they suspect an
illegal export is taking place. They sometimes call the
FBI. The FBI formerly had a practice of never sharing their
information/leads with the Customs agents, and so the
exports usually took place. The FBI studied the cases until
they were sure of a successful case, and that was often
after the export took place. Today the FBI is more willing
to cooperate with Customs in the investigation of illegal
export cases.
4. So how are most of the illegal exporters discovered?
*We have the statistics from January 1985 of successful
cases which are as follows:
- 52% utilized paid informants.
- 34% utilized cooperating industrial sources (no
payments).
- 5% utilized export interdiction actions at docks.
- 1% utilized routine reviews of export documentation
paperwork (Shipper Export Declarations).
- 1% utilized referrals from other agencies (case
spinoffs).
- 7% utilized other means.
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5. Could you characterize the illegal exporters? Do they
share any common traits? Could you predict who might be
tempted to illegally export arms? Is U.S. Customs
trying to work with manufacturers in identifying
indicators of potential illegal arms shipments?
*There are many motivations for this crime. There are
hardly any foreign agents. This crime doesn't ever seem to
be espionage-oriented with the Iranians. There were several
Iranian nationals involved. But there were more non-Iranian
nationals. The common denominator seems to be a greed for
money, and not a nationality nor political ideology. But
maybe the motivation is neither totally money-oriented nor
patriotically-oriented. Some Iranian students in the U.S.
possibly tried to justify their educational expense by
illegally shipping home needed parts. There was a mixed bag
of convictions of Iranian nationals and all other
nationalities.
If I had to guess at the motivation, I would put it at
85% greed and 15% loyalty to their homeland. So anyone who
had a prior record of arms sales and who was very greedy
might be a potential illegal exporter of arms.
6. So does Customs give any traits to be looked out for to
manufacturers that would indicate potentially illegal
exporting?
*Yes, Customs alerts companies to characteristics of
illegal arms transfers. A list of these is found in the
"Indicators of Possible Diversions" which is distributed to
manufacturers of items controlled for export to certain
countries. Also the FBI puts out cautions to companies with
classified government contracts in order to detect potential
thieves. They give characteristics of the guys who most
might be tempted to sell out.
7. Are there any loopholes in the laws that make detection
of export crimes more difficult?
*Yes, even when we are onto a suspected criminal, their
U.S. mail cannot be searched without a search warrant. The
same protection applies to Air Express shipments, which
might contain the actual illegally exported materials.
8. Did the prosecution or sentencing of illegal exports to
Iran become more severe after U.S. ships entered the
Persian Gulf and U.S. lives were at risk?
*No. There was a new emphasis on export controls in
1981 which actually "picked up steam" in 1982, but the U.S.
ships in the Persian Gulf didn't seem to affect this. I
think that Irangate affected the sentencing of export
violators as the courts and public became more aware of the
scope of the problem.
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9. Has the prosecution of criminals been effective in
stopping some of this traffic?
*Well, it has driven it more underground. By 1984
diversions became more rampant as Customs became more and
more successful at catching these illegal exporters. So
falsified end-user statements became more common, and
countries wouldn't ship the parts directly to Iran, but
rather would include an intermediary country.
10. Do you feel that Iran had the expertise in place to
properly utilize the parts she illegally obtained? Did
you see an effort to recruit foreign human expertise?
*There was at least some recruitment of foreign pilots
to fly Iranian aircraft and to train student pilots. There
might have been some efforts at recruiting foreign mainte-
nance types to assist/train Iranians, but then this became
illegal in the U.S. in 1985 with the ITAR (International
Traffic in Arms Regulations). I personally have not heard
of any maintenance types that were ever recruited.
11. Is your annual expenditure to interdict illegal arms
exports expensive, and do you consider it effective?
*In 1984 Customs spent $33 million in the efforts to
interdict illegal arms exports. And quoting Steve Walton,
our former director, our efforts:
- drove them underground,
- allowed us to see the same inquiries repeatedly,
- and made it much more difficult for them to obtain
needed parts.
Because of our efforts, the Iranians became much more
cautious of arms deals, which really drove their prices up
as our efforts became more intense and successful.
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1. In your opinion, how much effect did the illegal arms/
parts transfers have on Iran's war performance?
*The illegal arms transfers had no great effect on
Iran's war performance. With the U.S. embargo, all of
Iran's sophisticated U.S. arms systems continued degrading
due to insufficient spare parts. The other more commonly
used equipment, like small arms, mortars, artillery pieces/
ammunition, and tank parts were readily received from
communist countries. Although no tanks were known to have
been shipped to Iran, they had such a vast inventory at the
start of the war, that cannibalization successfully kept
sufficient numbers of tanks in an operational status.
2. Were the types of items illegally shipped to Iran
indicative of their current/future war plans?
*This is a difficult question to answer. I feel that
there was a link between the requests for parts and Iran's
war plans, but their parts procurement strategy was so
inefficient and disorganized that it was terribly difficult
to discover a cause and effect relationship. An example
which tends to dispute your question's truth is the failure
of Iran to request NBC (Nuclear/Biological/Chemical) equip-
ment either before or after Iraq's deadly chemical gas
attacks. You might expect Iran to stock up on the needed
protective equipment for their future chemical weapons
attacks, but this didn't occur.
3. What is your knowledge of the equipment/parts delivered
to Iran through the "Irangate" deals?
*To the best of my knowledge, which is pretty sketchy
from little publicity of the Irangate consequences, I
believe that TOW missiles, I-Hawk missiles, and possibly
Varian tubes were received by Iran.
4. What was the National Security damage caused by illegal
arms deliveries to Iran?
*Well, I'm unsure as to the effect of these deliveries
on the Hawk missile system's operational status, but this
system is very effective against overflying aircraft. If
the illegally delivered parts kept this system operational,
then our National Security was degraded by endangering our
nearby U.S. warplanes that potentially could have conducted
air strikes against Iranian territory. The TOW missiles
didn't have U.S. tanks as targets so would have caused
little concern. And maybe if F-14 parts could have kept all
Iranian F-14's in an operational status, then these aircraft
would have been a threat to overflying U.S. warplanes.
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5. Did the U.S. have countermeasures developed against
attacks by these U.S.-origin weapons?
*The existence of effective countermeasures is uncer-
tain. I think that we could have neutralized F-14 attacks
by our own F-14's, but I'm unsure of countermeasures
developed against the Hawk missile system.
6. Were the Chinese and North Korean sales to Iran of
military equipment a substantial percentage of their
arms receipt?
*According to Daniel Gallik in The World Military
Expenditures And Arms Transfers 1987 (by U.S. Government
Printing office, Washington, D.C., March 1988), greater than
50% of Iranian arms receipt arrived from Chinese/N. Korean
sources in 1987.
7. Do you feel that there is any intelligence value to be
gained from reviewing U.S. Customs indictments and court
records of illegal arms shipments?
*We already get much technical intelligence information
through other sources that you are aware of. I think that
we could learn the illegal arms networks and shipment
patterns through reviewing these court records. They could
help the government more successfully track illegal arms
shipments.
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1. Was there any correlation between the illegally shipped
U.S. arms/parts and Iran's war needs or her combat
performance?
*I don't think that the Iranians asked for any special
equipment needed for a certain upcoming offensive, nor did-
it seem that they changed their military equipment "shopping
list" based upon equipment battle casualties. Their list of
needed parts/materials remained the same for the duration of
the war. However, there was a marked improvement in their
performance against Iraqi armor during the Karbala 5 offen-
sive at the city of Al Barsah, due primarily to their far
greater supply/use of TOW missiles. We think that their
supply of these missiles was provided by the "Irangate"
shipments, and that the TOWs had a direct relationship on
the Iranian performance against Iraqi armor.
2. How much effect then did these illegally received items
have on Iran's war performance?
*While Iran was enabled to have been effective in this
one battle through the resupply of sophisticated U.S.
weapons, there was not a long-term effect. To have been
truly effective in improving Iran's war performance, the
illegally shipped U.S. weapons would have been required to
continuously arrive in Iran. This was not the case however.
The Iranians didn't get a further resupply of TOW missiles,
and they were not again as effective against Iraqi armor.
The illegal shipment of these weapons had a great short-term
effect, but no long-term effect.
3. What was the effect of the U.S. embargo against Iran,
and her world-wide embargo efforts through Operation
Staunch?
*Iraq began successful offensives against Iran in 1988
due to Iran's shortage of All weapons, and because of Iran's
lack of TOW missiles resulting in unstoppable Iraqi armor
advances. Iran began suffering a real shortage of tanks and
was unable to receive enough parts to keep enough tanks in
an operational status. They were able on a limited basis to
manufacture some of the less sophisticated tank parts
(sprockets and possible tracks) but couldn't produce the
more technical parts like fire control systems and radars.
Iran's internal manufacturing of parts was not effective in
a long-term analysis. Iran suffered greatly from a lack of
spare parts and weapons systems caused by the U.S. embargo
and Operation Staunch efforts.
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4. Did Iran try to acquire foreign technical experts to
maintain their sophisticated weapons systems?
*The revolutionary purges did result in a severe
degradation of Iranian technical expertise, but due to
cultural/religious pride, they didn't attempt to recruit
this type of foreign assistance to my knowledge.
5. For the Air Force expert, which type of aircraft did
Iran most depend upon during the war, and did Iran
receive enough parts to keep sufficient numbers of these
flying?
*The F-4/5 aircraft were the most utilized air frame
during the war. Although parts were received from other
countries for both of these aircraft, much cannibalization
occurred which left operational fewer than 50 F-4's out of
an original 221 aircraft, and fewer than 60 F-5's out of an
original 169 aircraft.
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1. Could you summarize Iran's military capability through
her war with Iraq?
*Iran was strongest at the start of the war and she grew
weaker from that point onwards. She began the war with
hundreds of M-48 and M-60 tanks, around 100 operational F-
4's, a lot of F-5's (I'm unsure of an estimated number), and
a vast stock of spare parts.
By the middle years of the war, Iran had experienced a
great degradation in numbers of operational units of many
weapons systems. Aircraft and tanks were both casualties of
combat and normal parts failures. But by this time there
were insufficient numbers of parts available to repair all
broken equipment. The human losses were staggering and
there was no way to effectively replace pilot and mainte-
nance personnel. These losses were caused not only from
Iraqi effectiveness, but from Iranian revolutionary execu-
tions and reprisals. The Iranians actually drove alongside
U.S. military equipment during the first days of the revolu-
tion and machine-gunned aircraft and other systems as a
demonstration of their hatred towards Americans. They
executed hundreds of Western-trained/sympathetic technicians
that were the only experts in maintenance of U.S. equipment.
Iran was so desperate for technical expertise that she
recruited the most successful graduates of Iranian high
schools and Iranian graduates of overseas technical
universities, and employed them in the maintenance of
sophisticated weaponry. They were paid the equivalence of
officer salaries, and though not treated with as much
respect as officers, they were in a class more influential
than the enlisted men. These technicians were called
"homofars," and were the equivalent of a warrant officer
position.
So by the time of the cease fire agreement, Iran had
attempted to internally train both pilots and maintenance
technicians, with only marginal results. The pilots were
able to fly the aircraft, whether or not they could
successfully maneuver them in combat situations. The
technicians were sometimes able to repair sophisticated
weapons systems, and sometimes not. But by the last days of
the war, Iran was suffering greatly from an across the board
lack of spare parts. About all she could consistently
receive was supplies of small arms/ammunition. But these
were the most successfully employed weapons that Iran used.
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2. Why didn't Iran try to recruit U.S./foreign maintenance
experts to repair her equipment?
*Iran did offer jobs to maintenance personnel from
former U.S. companies operating in her country, but there
were no takers on the offers. But the attempt to recruit
foreign technical expertise wasn't repeated due to Iran's
Islamic hatred of U.S. influence and her desire to keep as
many of these "foreign Satans" out of her country as
possible. They rejected any Western presence. The mere
idea of appealing to the "Great Satan" for assistance was
anathema. They would do all of their own maintenance and
pilot training the best way they could without foreign
intervention and contamination. Iran's revolutionary
leaders probably wouldn't have trusted American maintenance
technicians to work on their military equipment.
3. Did Iran have money shortages hampering arms sales near
the end of the war?
*There were money shortages near the end of the war due
to Iran's need to import food, raw materials for industry,
and machinery. Iran annually spent about $2.5 billion on
arms, and each year this accounted for a larger part of
their available resources.
4. Did Iran manufacture much of its military equipment
requirements?
*There was no machine tool industry in Iran, so they
were only able to manufacture simple technology items. This
consisted of producing only small arms, ammunition, and
artillery pieces/ammunition up to about 100 mm in size.
5. With their critical need for parts, how did Iran receive
parts following the U.S. embargo?
*Greater than 50% of their weapons supply receipt came
from Communist countries for most of the war. By the end of
the conflict, I feel that far greater than 50% came from
Communist sources, though I can't give a good percentage of
the amount. The remainder came from other Western sources
and from illegally shipped U.S. supplies.
6. Were the Iranians able to effectively utilize their
received parts?
*The Iranians got a lot of broken parts, and parts
beyond their service life dates. But if good parts were
received in Iran, and they were not lost in internal
shipping or at warehouses, then the technicians did know
what to do with them.
There is an aircraft overhaul and maintenance facility
in Teheran that did effectively fix their most complicated
gear, and there were personnel capable of routinely main-
taining complicated equipment. But you should understand
that this facility was not like the orthodox, high-level
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maintenance facilities found in the West. The Iranians did
whatever it took to make a system work, and if "tinkering"
with parts or "jury rigging" them to make a system work was
necessary, then they did this. And if an aircraft came into
the facility for overhaul, while it might make it out "over-
hauled," it might just as likely not emerge "overhauled."
7. Can you describe the Iranian logistic setup?
*The Iranian logistic setup was based on the American
system, with much computer filing and operation. But when
the U.S. support left Iran, there is evidence that many of
their records and computer programs were either erased or
sabotaged, resulting in a useless system turned over to the
Iranians. The Iranians could not locate the computer
programs dealing with their supply system (in many cases),
and often if they found the correct program, they discovered
the records to be erased upon entering them. So the Iranian
logistics system was essentially a shambles following the
U.S. withdrawal from their country.
8. Why didn't the Iranians utilize their F-14's to a
greater extent? Why didn't they share the technology
with other interested sources like the Soviets?
*The Iranian Air Force considered their F-14's a
national asset of key importance that was to be protected
and hidden. It was a secret, key national asset. No other
country possessed this aircraft except for the U.S. and so
they were very proud of it and protective towards it. They
felt about it like Americans feel about our "Stealth
Bomber." F-14's were the most sophisticated weapons that
Iran possessed and they were identified with the Iranian
national interest.
9. When did U.S. ships enter the Persian Gulf to protect
shipping?
*Approximately February 1987.
10. Were Americans ever prohibited from living in Iran after
our ouster, possibly to prevent technical assistance?
*Americans were never prohibited from living in Iran,
but none did after the embassy hostages were released.
11. Which U.S. parts were most often attempted to be
illegally shipped to Iran? How many of these actually
arrived?
*Aircraft parts, tank parts, vehicle parts, and Hawk
missile systems spare parts and missiles were most often
attempted for export. But only a "little trickle" of U.S.
parts were actually received in Iran, and these had a
largely irrelevant effect on Iran's military capability or
combat performance.
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12. What was the effect of the TOW missiles received through
the "Irangate" deals?
*Iran started the war with approximately 20,000 TOW
missiles. We believe that fewer than 2000 were received by
Iran through Irangate dealings. The number was probably
closer to 1600 TOW missiles received. Due to Iranian
inefficiency, probably not all of these were actually intro-
duced into combat. I think some of them were lost in ware-
houses around Iran, some were displayed on generals' jeeps
as status symbols, and some were just not delivered to the--
units needing them most that were on the fronts then
conducting battle operations. So many of the TOW missiles
received were not effectively utilized.
The question about Iranian success against Iraqi armor
at the Karbala 5 offensive indicates a misunderstanding of
the issue. There was always a large number of disabled
Iraqi tanks in every offensive, and the number of tank kills
in Karbala 5 was no different from that found in any other
offensive. And the fact remains that most Iranian kills of
Iraqi tanks occurred through the use of Iranian artillery
and not TOW missiles.
13. Did Operation Staunch become more effective, or more
vigorously pursued after U.S. warships entered the area
of potential combat operations?
*Operation Staunch was not pursued any more vigorously
because of the presence of U.S. warships in the Persian
Gulf. But it gave our U.S. diplomats more "punch" when
speaking to foreign diplomats that knew of the potential
danger to American lives in the region. And the danger to
American lives gave more publicity in the U.S. press
concerning the real need to cut off all arms sales to Iran.
14. Did the illegally exported U.S. arms/parts have any
effect on the availability rates for Iranian weapons
systems?
*No, there never was a radical change in the availabili-
ty rates for aircraft nor tanks. And the Hawk missile
system was probably barely operational since 1982. If
illegally transferred U.S. arms had been a significant
source of Iranian arms receipt, we probably would not be
seeing a cease fire now.
15. Did you see "high tech" weapons systems becoming func-
tional, even for a while, after receiving U.S. parts?
*No. Iran received very little, if any, in the way of
high tech parts, and if she did receive the parts, it had no
effect upon making any weapons system operational. But
unlerstand that by the end of the war Iran had devolved into
a Aow tech consumer that focused upon guns and bullets
rather than planes and missiles in their fight against the
Iraqis.
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16. In conclusion, do you feel that Iran's requests for
specific equipment/parts were a function of her war
needs or war plans?
*No. For the entire eight years of the war, Iran's
military "shopping list" remained essentially the same.
Sometimes Iran requested accelerated delivery of artillery
ammunition in anticipation of the routine and expected
Spring and Fall fighting. But there were no special
requests that were to be utilized in unique tactics in any
planned offensives, to the best of my knowledge. The only
difference I saw in Iran's equipment requests occurred
toward the end of the fighting when she asked for more "dual
use" items. I think these requests occurred because she
couldn't get items with a direct military application, and
had to resort to these dual use supplies.
Once again you must understand that the most responsible
and effective people were not in charge of requesting mili-
tary materials. Instead of military officers doing the
planning, you had committees of the religiously-oriented
Muslims deciding upon the needed equipment. This resulted
in a continuously more disorganized and less effective means
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE NORV" D8TCT O CAIFORNI4
10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 6.0~ JJ )10 )Criminal No.
Plaintiff,
11 VIOLATIONS: Title 22, United
v. States Code, Section 27i8;
12 22 C.F.R. Sections 123.1, 127.1,
KEN PARK, aka 127.3 -- Illegal Export of Arms;
13 KWAN PARK, Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1001; 15 C.F.R. Section
14 Defendant. 387.5 -- False Statement to
Department of the United States
16 INDICTMENT
17 COUNT ONE: (Title 22, United States Code, S 2778; 22 C.F.R.
18 55 123.1, 127.1, 127.3)
19 The Grand Jury charges: T H A T
20 On or about January 8, 1989, at the San Francisco
21 International Airport, State and Nprthern District of California,
22 KEN PARK, aka
KWAN PARK,
23
defendant herein, did willfully export from the United States
24
without a validated license for such export defense articles on
25
the United States Munitions List (22 C.F.R. $ 121.1) to wit, five
26
fire containers designed for use on F-14 fighter aircraft.
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1 All in violation of Title 22, United States Code, S 2778
2 and 22 C.F.R. S 123.1, 127.1 and 127.3.
3 COUNT TWO: (Title 22, United States Code, S 2778; 22 C.F.R.
4 SS 123.1, 127.1, 127.3)
5 The Grand Jury further charges: T H A T
6 On or about January 8, 1989, at the San Francisco
7 International Airport, State and Northern District of California,
8 KEN PARK, aka
9 KWAN PARK,
10 defendant herein, did willfully export from the United States
without a validated license for such export defense articles on
12 the United States Munitions List (22 C.F.R. S 121.1) to wit,
twelve fixed wire round resisters, which are part of the high13
14 powered target illuminator for the Hawk ground missile 
system.
All in violation of Title 22, UnitedStates Code,15
5 2778; and 22 C.F.R. 5S 123.1, 127.1 and 127.3.16
COUNT THREE: (Title 22, United States Code, S 2778; 22 C.F.R.17
1 5 123.1, 127.1, 127.3)18
The Grand Jury further charges: T H A T19
On or about January 8, 1989, at the ban krancisco20
International Airport, State and Northern District of California,21
KEN PARK, aka
22 KWAN PARK,
23 defendant herein, did willfully export from the United States
24 without a validated license for such export defense articles on
25 the United States Munitions List (22 C.F.R. S 121.1) to wit, two
26 hundred and sixteen wing and rolleron assemblies which are part of
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1
the Sidewinder missile system.
2
All in violation of Title 22, United States Code, S 2778
3
and 22 C.F.R. S5 123.1, 127.1 and 127.3.
4




The Grand Jury further charges: T H A T
7
On or about January 6, 1989, at the San Francisco




11 defendant herein, did knowingly and willfully make and cause to be
12 made false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and representa-
13 tions as to material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of
14 the United States Department of Commerce, a department of the
15 United States, in that in a Shipper's Export. Declaration, Form
16 7525-V, KEN PARK, aka KWAN PARK, represented that the commodities
17 in the shipment he was making consisted of truck and tractor parts
18 and other commodities which did not require a validated export
19 license, that the value of the commodities in the shipment was
20 $23,274, and that the shipment license designation was the general
21 license "G Dest," whereas, in truth and fact, as KEN PARK, aka KEN
22 PARK, well knew, the commodities in the shipment included military
23 aircraft parts which were valued substantially in excess of
24 $23,274 and which required a validated export license and "G Dest'
25 was not the proper license designation..
26 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, S 1001
and 15 C.F.R. S 387.5.
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COUNT FIVE: (Title 22, United States Code, S 2778; 22 C.F.R.
2 SS 123.1, 127.1, 127.3)
3
The Grand Jury further charges: T H A T
4
On or about October 29, 1988, at the San Francisco
International Airport, State and Northern District of California,
6 KEN PARK, aka
7 KWAN PARK,
8 defendant herein, did willfully export from the United States
9 without a license defense articles on the United States Muniticns
10 List (22 C.F.R. S 121.1) to wit, fifteen VA-933A E-Tubes which are
used to illuminate the target for the Sparrow missile system which
12 is used on the fire control radar system of the McDonnell Douglas
13 F-4 fighter plane.
14 All in violation of Title 22, United States Code, S 2778
15 and 22 C.F.R. S 123.1, 127.1 and 127.3.
16 COUNT SIX: (Title 18, United States Code, S 1001; 15 C.F.R.
17 S387.5)
The Grand Jury further charges: T H A T18
On or about October 28, 1988, at the San Francisco19
International Airport, State and Northern District of California,20
KEN PARK, aka
21 KWAN PARK,
22 defendant herein, did knowingly and willfully make and cause to be
23 made false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and representa-
24 tions as to material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of
25 the United States Department of Commerce, a department of the
26 United States, in that in a Shipper's Export Declaration, Form
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1
7525-V, KEN PARK, aka KWAN PARK, represented that the commodities
2
in the shipment he was making consisted of truck and tractor parts
3
and other commodities which did not require a validated export
4
license, that the value of the commodities in the shipment was
5
$5,901, and that the shipment license designation was the general
6
license "G Dest," whereas, in truth and fact, as KEN PARK, aka KEN
7
PARK, well knew, the commodities in the shipment included military o8
aircraft parts which were valued substantially in excess of $5,901
9
and which required a validated export license and "G Dest" was not
10 the proper license designation.
11
12 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, S 1001
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APPENDIX C
COMPLICATIONS IN LEGAL CASE STUDY
One aspect of this thesis is the problem of obtaining
court documents for use by an intelligence analyst. In
doing the case study this author found the process of
finding the records very simple, yet that is only a small
part of procedure.
Court records are found throughout the U.S. Each
defendant is tried in the district in which the crime was
committed; therefore, the first step is to find the court
which adjudicated the case. Then one must travel to the
proper city where the court is located. This may sound
simple, yet districts may be quite confusing, for example,
the Central District of California is located in Los Angeles
(not quite central California).
Once the courthouse is located (usually in a federal
building), and the Office of the Clerk of Courts for
Criminal Cases is found, the search is facilitated. In both
offices this author visited, cases are listed alphabetically
on microfiche. One must merely look up the defendant's name
to find the case number, under which everything is filed.
Once the case number is determined, a clerk will retrieve
the records from an array of records, if the record is in
the file. On one occasion the case file was "in chambers"
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and therefore inaccessible for some undetermined time. The
clerk said she would be happy to send a copy of the contents
of the file when it is returned. Much to my delight, a copy
of the entire file was received in six days.
Upon acquiring the files, one must remain in the direct
vicinity, presumably so none of the documents will be lost
or borrowed. While some files merely contain an indictment,
others can have a multitude of volumes (the Inanlou case had
eight). A clerk is required to Xerox any copies of
documents one may want. In San Diego, this would take
approximately two to three days, at a cost of $.50 per page.
Requests in excess of 50 pages would be handled by an
outside firm, hired by the requestor. This procedure has
varying costs, from $165 and $.15 per copy to $13 and $.25
per copy. The independent copier brings in his own
microfiche machine, takes the picture, transcribes this to a
paper copy, all in two to three days. The one difficulty
found with this procedure is that most companies deal only
with attorneys, or want a deposit prior to any work.
Court personnel and federal agencies are supposed to get
copies done by the court at no expense, however, it appears
that there is some confusion as to what a federal agency is
or how many copies can be obtained free. While this author
was in San Diego researching documents for this thesis, she
was told by a clerk that they would reproduce an unlimited
number of copies at no expense, because the work was being
133
done for a DoD project. A week after returning to Monterey,
the author received a phone call informing her that the
requested number of copies was too great for their office to
handle and that she should possibly seek an independent
contractor for the job. The clerk stated that they would
keep the request forms containing the description of the
copies desired so the commercial copying company could come
in and do the task. Two days later this author received the
aforementioned requests in the mail.
Another stumbling block is found in court transcripts of
the actual trial proceedings. Although few cases actually
go to trial, transcripts would contain a wealth of informa-
tion and give the opposing points of the case. Court
proceedings are recorded in a sort of shorthand, not
readable by the layperson. To have this "code" transcribed
into a discernable format is quite expensive, depending on
the length of the trial. A court recorder is usually hired
as an independent representative, thus the work is done when
time permits. In recent years the courts have been
overloaded. Except in rare cases, when the client is
prominent, or an appeal is sought, obtaining a transcript
can be quite difficult.
The unfortunate experiences outlined above may be
limited to this specific author, yet the lack of cooperation
and understanding is assumed to prevail throughout the
system. If the use of court documents by intelligence
134
personnel became a mainstay, it is hoped that measures would
be taken to facilitate the process.
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APPENDIX D
STOLEN PARTS LISTED IN THE INANLOU INDICTMENT
Date Date
Stolen Item Value Exported
12/84 One gimbal assembly for $77,000 12/19/84
inertial navigation sys-
tem
One Bendix GJ-G8 gas tur- $64,000
bine fuel control
1/85 One gimbal assembly for $77,000 1/29/85
inertial navigation sys-
tem
Two parametric amplifiers $45,000
for the Phoenix Missile
System
1/85 One Bendix CJ-G8 gas tur- $64,000 1/29/85
bine fuel control
2/85 One Bendix CJ-G8 gas tur- $64,000 2/17/85
bine fuel control
Two angle of attack com- $15,000
puters
One lower wing faring $3,000
panel
Two angle of attack $150
indexers
4/85 One infrared recorder $150,000






Sixteen torque actuator $1,200
rings
5/85 One drive constant speed $52,000 5/27/85
6/85 One angle computer $9,500 6/20/85
Seven vane turbine noz- $6,000
zles
One power supply $5,000
One electron tube $1,100
Two quick coupling $900
tubes
7/85 One gimbal assembly $96,000 7/5/85
for an inertial nav-
igation system
One parametric ampli- $30,000
fier for the Phoenix
Missile System
Four cable assemblies $11,000
5/85 Three signal data $1,380,000
computers
Four gimbal assemblies $380,000
for inertial navigation
systems
One multi-plex filter $240,000
Two weapon indicator $132,000
controls
Seven circuit card $37,000
assemblies
Two electron tubes $2,300
5/85 One film magazine $37,000
One infrared analyzer $18,000
One duct assembly $2,000
One pressure switch $380
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5/85 One drive constant $52,000
speed
7/85 One servo-mechanism $6,000
amplifier
Two seal assemblies $800
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